The number of US community banks is falling rapidly. Is this reduction being driven in part by banks’ desire to geographically diversify to reduce their vulnerability to local economic shocks? A comparison of the performance of banks in counties that suffered economic shocks in the 1990s with similar banks in counties that did not suffer economic shocks shows that banks withstand local economic shocks quite well. This result suggests that the geographic concentration risk that community banks must bear to focus on relationship lending is small and is not an important factor contributing to the decline of community banks.

We develop a top-down macro stress test that assesses a community bank's ability to withstand a severe and prolonged period of high credit losses. The model groups banks by geography and subjects them to the 90th percentile chargeoff rates that banks experienced between 2008 and 2012. Because of local data limitations, our historical loss approach better reflects patterns of community bank stress than a linear econometric approach that estimates the relationship between macroeconomic conditions and bank performance. We put all U.S. community banks at year-end 2017 through the test and highlight two results. First, banks are much better prepared to withstand an adverse shock than they were on the verge of the financial crisis because banks have shifted away from the riskiest loan types. Second, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 has increased bank insolvency risk from an adverse shock in 2018 because the higher bank capital is more than offset by the weaker automatic stabilizer effect from operating losses.

Since the early 1990s, commercial banks have turned to Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLBank) advances to plug the gap between loan and deposit growth. Is this trend worrisome? On the one hand, advances implicitly encourage risk by insulating borrowers from market discipline. On the other, advances give borrowers greater flexibility to managing interest rate and liquidity risk. And access to FHLBank funding encourages members to reshape their balance sheets in ways that could lower credit risk. Using quarterly financial and supervisory data for banks from 1992 to 2005, we assess the effect of FHLBank membership and advances on risk. The evidence suggests liquidity and leverage risks rose modestly, but interest-rate risk declined somewhat. Credit risk and overall failure risk were largely unaffected. Although the evidence suggest FHLBank membership and advances have had, at best, only a modest impact on bank risk, we caution that our sample period constitutes one observation and that moral hazard could be pronounced if leverage ratios revert to historical norms.

Bank supervisors utilize early warning signals to predict which banks are likely to become distressed. Previous research has found that market discipline signals do not significantly improve out-of-sample forecasts relative to accounting-based signals. Most of that evidence, however, comes from periods in the 1990s when the U.S. economy and banking system were healthy, potentially neutralizing an advantage of market signals to incorporate new information quickly. For the period between the fourth quarters of 2006 and 2012, we assess the accuracy of two market signals – expected default frequency (EDF) and subordinated note and debenture (SND) yield spreads – relative to accounting-based signals in forecasting which publicly traded BHCs would become distressed. In 2008, EDF signals were relatively more accurate, but they did not lead to economically significant reductions in missed distress events relative to other signals. Supervisors would have been better off devoting slack resources to monitor BHCs with high commercial real estate concentrations. As the crisis subsided, a failure probability model developed from bank failures in the 1980s and early 1990s was consistently the most accurate signal. For the two dozen BHCs with actively traded SNDs, yield spreads over Treasuries were extremely poor predictors of distress because the spreads were distorted by too-big-to-fail subsidies. The Tier 1 leverage ratio was the most accurate distress signal for these large BHCs. In sum, the evidence to justify systematic reliance on market signals by supervisory agencies to forecast bank distress remains weak.

Opacity fosters price contagion that exacerbates the speculative cycles of bubbles and crashes that create financial instability. We find that banks with larger investments in opaque assets benefitted more from intra-industry revaluations associated with announcements of mergers in the period 2000–2006. The findings are robust to controls for competitive effects, spillover effects from higher likelihood of takeover, changes in real estate prices, and interest rates. Non-merger banks that gained most from merger activities also experienced the largest price declines during the subsequent 2007–2008 financial crisis.

We examine whether the financial market charged a default risk premium to US Treasury securities when the US Federal government repeatedly reached the legally binding debt limits between 2002 and 2006. We show that for the first two of the four recurrences since the first episode in 1996, the financial market charged a small default risk premium to the Treasury securities. However, we find no significant evidence of a pricing effect in the last two recurrences. The results suggest that the financial market gradually perceived the budget standoffs as the boy who cried wolf.

We examine the effects of opacity on bank valuation and synchronicity in bank equity returns over the years 2000–2006 prior to the 2007 financial crisis. As expected, investments in opaque assets are more profitable than investments in transparent assets, and taking profitability into account, have larger valuation discounts relative to transparent assets. The valuation discounts on opaque asset investments decline over the 2000–2006 period only to be followed by a sharp reversal in 2007. The decline is coincident with a rise in bank equity share prices, decrease in transparent asset holdings by banks, and greater return synchronicity – evidence consistent with a feedback effect.