This article reports an asset market experiment in which asymmetrically informed traders transact through competing dealers. Dealers face a classic adverse selection problem, because some traders have private information regarding the asset value while other traders are uninformed. When dealers cannot communicate outside the market, they price the asset competitively and the market is generally informationally efficient. When dealers communicate privately between periods, they collude successfully to widen spreads and increase profit. Another treatment permits traders to post limit orders, while still allowing dealers to communicate. Limit orders restore informational efficiency and narrow spreads but cause dealers to earn negative trading profits.

Journal Article The Opportunity for Conspiracy in Asset Markets Organized with Dealer Intermediaries Get access Timothy N. Cason Timothy N. Cason Purdue University Address correspondence to Timothy N. Cason, Department of Economics, Krannert School of Management, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 47907-1310, or E-mail: [email protected]. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 13, Issue 2, April 2000, Pages 385–416, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/13.2.385 Published: 15 June 2015