Abstract Auditing standards prescribe a risk‐based approach where auditors assess the risk of material misstatement and then design and perform audit procedures to reduce audit risk to an appropriately low level. Prior research suggests that auditors are responsive to high control‐risk assessment ( CRA ), but that this response is, perhaps, only partially effective at reducing audit risk, with relatively little insight into where and why this occurs. By refining analyses to more detailed levels of the audit, I extend this research by providing further insight into auditors’ response to high CRA . I examine and find that audit fees are significantly higher for high CRA in revenue relative to high CRA in other accounts, suggesting that auditor effort in response to high CRA is more pronounced in audit areas of particular interest and concern to investors and regulators. Despite this, I find evidence suggesting that revenue is the only audit area examined where auditor effort in response to high CRA does not attenuate the likelihood of misstatement. Finally, because auditors face time constraints, I examine whether increased effort in response to high CRA in certain audit areas diverts auditors’ attention from other areas with lower risk, thus contributing to the overall association between misstatements and internal control deficiencies documented in prior research. I find a greater likelihood of misstatement in non‐core operating accounts with lower CRA as audit effort increases in response to high CRA in revenue, consistent with the explanation that high CRA in revenue may divert auditors’ attention from other areas of the audit with lower CRA .

Abstract In this study, we investigate the consequences that auditors and their clients face when earnings announced in an unaudited earnings release are subsequently revised, presumably as a result of year‐end audit procedures, so that earnings as reported in the 10‐K differ from earnings as previously announced. Specifically, we examine whether the likelihood of an auditor “losing the client” is greater following such revisions, and whether the likelihood of dismissal is influenced by revisions that more negatively impact earnings, that cause the client to miss important earnings benchmarks, by greater local auditor competition, or by auditor characteristics. We also examine audit pricing subsequent to audit‐related earnings revisions for evidence of pricing concessions to retain the client. Finally, we examine whether client executives experience a greater likelihood of turnover following an audit‐related earnings revision. Consistent with expectations, we find that auditor dismissals are more likely following audit‐related earnings revisions. We also find that dismissals are more likely when revisions cause clients to miss important benchmarks and when there is greater local auditor competition. Among nondismissing clients, we find that future audit fees are lower when the effect of the revision on earnings is more negative, consistent with auditors offering price concessions to retain clients when revisions are more displeasing. We also find a greater likelihood of future chief financial officer ( CFO ) turnover as the effect of the revision worsens. Our findings offer important insights into the consequences that auditors face when balancing their responsibility for high audit quality and client satisfaction, as well as into the consequences that CFO s face when releasing inflated but not fully audited earnings.

ABSTRACT In this paper, we examine how CEO succession and succession planning affect perceptions of financial reporting risk among stakeholders who are responsible for and oversee firms' financial reporting (e.g., auditors, management, and audit committees). Management succession introduces uncertainty about firms' future operations, financial policies, and potential motivation for earnings management, which we predict elevates the perceived risk of financial reporting improprieties. Consistent with this prediction, we find that audit fees are higher for firms with new CEOs. Importantly, however, we note that careful CEO succession planning (i.e., promoting an “heir apparent”) attenuates perceptions of higher risk, as evidenced by a lack of an audit pricing adjustment. These results are robust to several alternative specifications and analyses designed to mitigate the concern that the association between audit fees and CEO succession and succession planning is driven by factors leading to the CEO change. We also show that audit fee increases dissipate over time as the new, non-heir CEO stays longer at the firm, reinforcing the inference that audit fees increase in response to the uncertainty surrounding a new CEO. Additionally, we do not find evidence of a deterioration in audit quality with new CEOs, independent of the succession plan. JEL Classifications: G30; M12; M41; M42.