SAS No. 99 requires brainstorming sessions on each audit to help auditors detect fraud. This study investigates audit team brainstorming sessions and the resulting fraud judgments. The psychology literature provides mixed results on the benefits of brainstorming. Results from my experiment suggest that while the overall number of ideas is reduced, brainstorming audit teams generate more quality fraud ideas than individual auditors generate before the brainstorming session. Further, audit teams generate new quality fraud ideas during the brainstorming session. Results also suggest that audit teams' fraud risk assessments after the brainstorming session are significantly higher than those assessments given by individual auditors on the team prior to the brainstorming session, especially when fraud is present. These results should be informative to standard setters as they suggest that brainstorming audit teams' generation of new quality fraud ideas and their improved fraud risk assessments will likely enhance their ability to identify fraud.

The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board is concerned about auditors' tendency to ignore relevant information that is inconsistent with management's assumptions underlying complex estimates. We find that priming auditors to consider how management arrived at a particular assumption helps curb aggressive reporting by encouraging auditors to engage in low‐level, concrete thinking regarding the direct evidence underlying the assumption. Low‐level, concrete thinking enhances auditors' sensitivity to relevant contradictory evidence. We also find that auditors reviewing graphical (versus textual) evidence are more skeptical of aggressive assumptions underlying a complex estimate. Evidence suggests that this is because graphs provide a better cognitive fit for tasks requiring comparisons and associations among data points. Our study is important to practitioners, regulators, and researchers as it sheds light on how a simple prime and the presentation format of audit evidence influence auditors' professional skepticism in this area. Additionally, it supports audit firms' initiatives to transform data to more visual formats by highlighting a context in which graphs improve auditors' judgments. Finally, we provide evidence as to how different primes affect auditors' evaluation of evidence, which can be useful in designing more effective audit plans.

The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) recently suggested that auditors' lack of specific fraud planning documentation has led auditors to devote insufficient attention to fraud risks in subsequent audit work. Guided by Support Theory, we experimentally investigate how the specificity of fraud risk documentation during audit planning influences auditors' subsequent audit work. We also examine the effect of priming auditors about the fraud risks identified during planning before they begin subsequent evidence evaluation. We find that auditors' planning stage efforts affect subsequent fraud risk assessments and evidence evaluation decisions. Unprimed auditors who receive more specific documentation increase their fraud risk assessments and evidence requests. Priming's effects are more complex. Priming auditors who receive summary documentation also increases fraud risk assessments and evidence requests; however, priming auditors who receive specific documentation reduces these judgments because the priming makes the client-specific risks seem less typical. Accordingly, the PCAOB's call for more documentation can have the unintended consequence of reducing auditors' sensitivity to fraud.

Digitalization is transforming the audit profession. Apprenticeship norms prescribe that knowledge flows down from supervisors to subordinates, but digitalization increasingly positions junior auditors as experts in emerging technology. Consequently, supervisors can learn from subordinates. This reversal challenges long-standing apprenticeship expectations, yet little is known about how it unfolds or the tensions it creates. Against this backdrop, we examine tensions that can arise when subordinate auditors share their knowledge with supervisors. Drawing on 51 semistructured interviews and guided by theory, we identify four recurring roadblocks to upward knowledge sharing: junior auditors' status motives, “same as last year” routines, status insecurity among immediate supervisors, and defensiveness when juniors cross perceived knowledge “lanes.” We also find a rare, countervailing pathway: the emergence of informal champions who legitimize junior auditors' contributions. Our study deepens understanding of how digitalization transforms team learning in audits and shows how historical structures and norms evolve under new conditions. Data Availability: Data were obtained from interviews.

Audit standards require auditors to conduct fraud brainstorming sessions on every audit. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board has raised concerns about auditors’ fraud judgments and the quality of their brainstorming sessions. We develop a measure of brainstorming quality to examine how it affects auditors’ fraud decision-making processes. We test our measure using field survey data of auditors’ actual brainstorming sessions for 179 audit engagements. Respondents report considerable variation in the quality of brainstorming in practice. We find some evidence that high-quality brainstorming improves the relations between fraud risk factors and fraud risk assessments. We also determine that brainstorming quality positively moderates the relations between fraud risk assessments and fraud-related testing. Our results suggest that the benefits of brainstorming do not apply uniformly, because low-quality sessions likely incur the costs of such interactions without receiving the attendant benefits. By documenting best practices from high-quality brainstorming sessions, our findings can inform auditors on how to improve their consideration of fraud.

Data analytics is transforming our global markets and significantly impacting the financial reporting environment. We investigate how auditors, company managers, and regulation interact with data analytics and one another to affect the diffusion (i.e., development and spread) of data analytics throughout the financial reporting environment. We interview company managers and their audit partners, as well as additional stakeholders, including regulators. We interpret findings from our interviews using theory that highlights the importance of dynamic interactions between people and their environments, which include the prevailing rules (e.g., regulatory guidance). Our findings contribute to the accounting literature and practice by revealing three areas of conflict emerging from stakeholders' disparate preferences for data analytics. First, we uncover growing tensions between managers and audit partners regarding audit fees. Second, we find that managers and auditors believe the lack of accounting regulation specific to data analytics causes confusion and frustration. Finally, auditors report that they strategically leverage data analytics to provide clients with business‐related insights. However, regulators voice concerns that this practice might impair auditor independence and reduce audit quality. These areas of conflict suggest a need to revisit key tensions surrounding the audit function in a contemporary context characterized with significant technological shift.