We document a strong positive initial market reaction to merger announcements from bidders with either large earnings growth or significant earnings decline, relative to those with neutral earnings change, reflecting a U-shaped pattern between bidders’ earnings growth and announcement returns. However, the higher initial returns for bidders with earnings decline subsequently reverse, whereas the higher returns for bidders with high growth do not. We further show that the return patterns are driven by a tendency for retail investors to gamble that merger and acquisition deals initiated by poorly performing bidders will generate high synergies.

Using novel merger valuation data, we show that firms selected by investment banks as “comparable peers” are more than twice as likely to later become takeover targets themselves compared to matched control firms. Peer firms not subsequently acquired attract more institutional ownership and analyst coverage, deliver strong operating performance, reduce investments, and increase payouts. Investors are inattentive, though, to peer identification at the time of merger filings’ public disclosure. A portfolio that longs peers and shorts controls earns up to 15.6% alpha annually, which mainly comes from the long leg and is difficult to explain by short-sale constraints.