The SEC promulgated the Securities Offering Reform (SOR) in 2005 to ease disclosure restrictions prior to seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). The SEC argued that SOR would improve the information environment, but critics claimed it would allow firms to hype their stock. This paper is the first to examine the information environment at the time of capital formation under SOR. We find more frequent and accurate management earnings forecasts, more 8-K filings, greater absolute market-adjusted returns, and more positive stock returns leading up to the SEO issue date indicating a richer pre-SEO information environment with capital formation benefits after SOR.

We examine the outside director selection process using unique data on appointments of academic directors. Overall, we find that academic directors tend to be appointed by small- and mid-cap firms expanding their boards. However, we find important differences in both the factors influencing academic appointments and the market's reaction when allowing for firm, board, and director heterogeneities. Academics in science, medicine and engineering appear to be appointed for their expertise, and the market reacts favorably. Academic administrators appear to be appointed for their networks, and the market reacts favorably when the administrator is affiliated with a business school but negatively when the administrator is not within close geographic proximity. Business professors appear to be appointed for general expertise and reputation, but we find little evidence of any significant market reaction. The results in this paper highlight the importance of recognizing heterogeneity in understanding the director selection process and the role of outside directors.