Most information that public firms are required to disclose is relatively hard (e.g., historical information), whereas the disclosure of relevant information that is softer in nature (e.g., forward-looking information) is typically left to firms' discretion. The lack of a mandatory requirement to disclose soft information has been at the heart of a number of on-going accounting debates. This study shows that while mandating disclosure increases the frequency of disclosure, it results in a reduction in disclosure quality when information is soft. By exploring this tradeoff, the paper sheds light on the merits of restricting mandatory disclosure requirements to verifiable information and leaving disclosure of soft information unregulated. The value of leaving disclosure unregulated is shown to be maximized when managers are given bonus-based compensation, with minimum performance thresholds and maximum caps, similar to those documented in the literature.

This paper analyzes a manager's optimal expectations management strategy in a setting in which the manager provides forecast guidance to an analyst both privately and publicly. Conventional wisdom suggests that managers use private communications with analysts and public earnings forecasts interchangeably to guide analysts' earnings forecasts downward toward lower earnings targets. Our analysis shows that in markets with rational investors, private and public guidance play very different roles in managing expectations, and that managers benefit from downward guidance only in their private communication with analysts. In their public forecasts, they benefit from introducing an upward bias. We explore how the effectiveness of the private and public channels in communicating information to analysts affects managers' incentive to engage in expectations management, and provide a number of empirical predictions. Among other results, we show how reducing private communication between managers and analysts (through means such as Regulation Fair Disclosure) can increase price efficiency, weaken managers' motivation to engage in private, as well as public, expectations management, and increase managers' motivation to provide public disclosures.

Our analysis is rooted in the notion that stockholders can learn about the fundamental value of any firm from observing the earnings reports of its rivals. We argue that such intraindustry information transfers, which have been broadly documented in the empirical literature, may motivate managers to alter stockholders’ beliefs about the value of their firm not only by manipulating their own earnings report but also by influencing the earnings reports of rival firms. Managers obviously do not have access to the accounting system of peer firms, but they can nevertheless influence the earnings reports of rival firms by distorting real transactions that relate to the product market competition. We demonstrate such managerial behavior, which we refer to as cross‐firm real earnings management, and explore its potential consequences and interrelation with the practice of accounting‐based earnings management within an industry setting with imperfect (nonproprietary) accounting information.