An audit committee (AC) report is the primary channel through which investors learn about the responsibilities and activities of an AC. AC members may use personal language (“we”) or impersonal language (“the audit committee”) in an AC report. Psychology research suggests that personal (vs. impersonal) language signals that the language user has greater warmth and sense of communion (i.e., being part of a larger group). Applying this theory, we predict that an AC's use of personal (vs. impersonal) language leads investors to perceive a warmer and more communal AC, and that an AC's perceived warmth/communion (cued by personal language) positively impacts investor judgments. We further posit that the positive effect of personal language is stronger when AC compensation is largely short term than long term. This is because investors need more assurance of AC oversight effectiveness when AC compensation is short term, which makes investors rely more on heuristic cues such as AC language to make judgments. Consistent with this prediction, we find that when AC compensation is largely short term, nonprofessional investors (proxied by Master of Business Administration students) react more positively to an AC's use of personal language than impersonal language. The effect of AC language is insignificant when AC compensation is largely long term, as the long‐term compensation structure already provides assurance about the AC's oversight effectiveness, and thus, investors rely less on heuristic cues. Furthermore, we find that the perceived warmth of AC members explains the effect of AC language. Finally, our interviews with nonprofessional investors corroborate some of our main findings and validate their practice implications.

ABSTRACT We conduct two experiments to investigate the joint effect of two justification factors of earnings management—namely, attribution for the firm's underperformance and benefits accruing to other employees from inflating reported earnings. This investigation is important because prior research examines the effects of individual justification factors, whereas real‐world settings entail more complexity involving multiple justification factors. In Experiment 1, we predict and find that managers are more likely to manage earnings when the firm's underperformance is caused by an external event and misreported earnings benefit other employees besides the reporting manager. Furthermore, we show that the extent to which participants use moral justifications mediates the effect of benefits sharing on earnings management, but only when causal attribution is external, and that it mediates the effect of causal attribution on earnings management, but only when benefits are shared. In Experiment 2, we use a neutral control condition that makes no mention of inconsistent incentives to demonstrate that it is the combination of causal attribution and benefits sharing that triggers earnings management. We contribute to the accounting and psychology literature by proposing and testing a theory that explains how multiple justification factors interact to cause opportunistic behavior. Our results suggest that policy‐makers and governing parties should consider developing a holistic view of possible justification factors, focusing on situational opportunities created by combinations of factors rather than individual factors alone.

ABSTRACT Audit firms have invested significantly in data analytics (DA). However, evidence shows that auditors are often reluctant to rely on DA. A major auditor concern is that inspectors will second-guess the audit evidence gathered using DA. Drawing on psychology research, we examine how the effect of inspection risk on auditors' reliance on DA is moderated by a fixed mindset (a belief that one's ability is fixed) versus a growth mindset (a belief that one's ability is malleable). In an experiment with Big 4 auditors as participants, we find that, relative to low inspection risk, high inspection risk reduces auditors' reliance on DA when auditors are prompted to adopt a fixed mindset but increases it when auditors are prompted to adopt a growth mindset. Our findings contribute to auditing literature on DA, inspection risk, and mindsets, and have implications for auditors, audit firms, and regulators.