How much capital should financial intermediaries hold? We propose a general equilibrium model with a financial sector that makes risky long‐term loans to firms, funded by deposits from savers. Government guarantees create a role for bank capital regulation. The model captures the sharp and persistent drop in macro‐economic aggregates and credit provision as well as the sharp change in credit spreads observed during financial crises. Policies requiring intermediaries to hold more capital reduce financial fragility, reduce the size of the financial and non‐financial sectors, and lower intermediary profits. They redistribute wealth from savers to the owners of banks and non‐financial firms. Pre‐crisis capital requirements are close to optimal. Counter‐cyclical capital requirements increase welfare.

We provide strong evidence of a countercyclical sensitivity of the stock market to major macroeconomic announcements. The most notable cyclical variation takes place within expansions: sensitivity is largest early in an expansion and essentially zero late in an expansion. By exploiting the comovement pattern between stocks and bonds around announcements, we show that the stock market sensitivity is large when the cash flow component of news is least offset by news about future risk-free rates. Observed fluctuations in stock sensitivities can be attributed to shifting perceptions of monetary policy responsiveness.