This paper tests alternative theories about the effect of asset liquidity on capital structure. Using data from a broad sample of U.S. public companies, I find that leverage is positively related to asset liquidity. Further analysis reveals that the relation between asset liquidity and secured debt is positive, whereas the relation between asset liquidity and unsecured debt is curvilinear. The results are consistent with the view that the costs of financial distress and inefficient liquidation are economically important and that they affect capital structure decisions. In addition, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that the costs of managerial discretion increase with asset liquidity.

Previous studies report that cash holdings are more valuable for financially constrained firms than for unconstrained firms. We examine (i) why this is so and (ii) why some constrained firms appear to hold too little cash. Our results indicate that greater cash holdings are associated with higher levels of investment for constrained firms with high hedging needs and that the association between investment and value is stronger for constrained firms than for unconstrained firms. These findings imply that higher cash holdings allow constrained firms to undertake value-increasing projects that might otherwise be bypassed. We further find that some constrained firms exhibit low cash holdings because of persistently low cash flows. Overall, our findings support the view that greater cash holdings of constrained firms are a value-increasing response to costly external financing.

[Previous studies report that cash holdings are more valuable for financially constrained firms than for unconstrained firms. We examine (i) why this is so and (ii) why some constrained firms appear to hold too little cash. Our results indicate that greater cash holdings are associated with higher levels of investment for constrained firms with high hedging needs and that the association between investment and value is stronger for constrained firms than for unconstrained firms. These findings imply that higher cash holdings allow constrained firms to undertake value-increasing projects that might otherwise be bypassed. We further find that some constrained firms exhibit low cash holdings because of persistently low cash flows. Overall, our findings support the view that greater cash holdings of constrained firms are a value-increasing response to costly external financing.]

Contrary to earlier studies, we find that prior client performance is a significant determinant of the likelihood that an investment bank will be chosen as the advisor by future acquirers and of the changes through time in banks' shares of the advisory business. Further, the changes in the market values of acquirers at the announcement of acquisition attempts are positively correlated with contemporaneous changes in the market values of their advisors. Two implications arise: (1) acquirers consider advisors' prior client performance when choosing their advisors and (2) market forces work to align advisors' and clients' interests in the acquisition market.

While reports in the financial press suggest that share repurchases are harmful to bondholders, academic studies report conflicting empirical evidence. Using newly available daily bond data (versus monthly data used in existing studies) and modern methods of analysis, we find no evidence of bondholder wealth expropriation. Merton (1974) model estimates of changes in the value of debt during share repurchases and changes in credit ratings following share repurchases produce no evidence of bondholder wealth expropriation. Overall, we find no evidence that repurchases measurably harm bondholders, suggesting concerns raised in the financial press are unfounded.

We document that employee bankruptcy costs affect corporate capital structure decisions via their impact on the bargaining power of labor unions. We employ difference-in-differences and triple-difference research designs surrounding a major bankruptcy reform that increased personal bankruptcy costs. Our results suggest that, on average, this reform reduced unions’ bargaining power, resulting in a decrease in the financial leverage of unionized firms relative to nonunionized firms. Our results provide new evidence for a relatively unexplored determinant of capital structure—personal bankruptcy costs.

This paper studies the impact of the 2003 SEC Regulation requiring shareholder approval of all equity-based executive compensation plans on executive compensation policies and practices at S&P 500 firms. Following the 2003 Regulation, firms with shareholder approved equity plans in place or those with strong performance, while not those with non-approved plans or weak performance, increase their equity compensation proposal submission activity. The quality of equity compensation proposals improves in the after-regulation period, and shareholders exhibit greater scrutiny and monitoring of executive compensation through increased voting rights. We find a decline in the equity pay component while an increase in the cash component of total executive compensation after the 2003 Regulation and also provide evidence that the 2003 Regulation contributes to this change in compensation structure.