An important dimension of audit committee (AC) effectiveness that has gained the attention of regulators and academics is the financial expertise of AC members (General Accounting Office 1991; Public Oversight Board 1993; Kalbers and Fogarty 1993; DeZoort 1997, 1998; Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees 1999; DeZoort, Hermanson, Archambeault, and Reed 2002; Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 [SOX] 2002; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, and Wright 2004). Section 407 of SOX requires the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to adopt rules mandating that the AC of public firms include at least one member who is a financial expert or disclose reasons for not adopting this requirement. While SOX proposes a narrow definition of financial expertise, to include individuals with experience in accounting or auditing, the SEC controversially adopted a broader definition of financial expertise that includes accounting and certain types of nonaccounting (finance and supervisory) financial expertise ....

This study examines the association between internal control deficiencies (ICDs) reported under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX, U.S. House of Representatives 2002) and the presence of former audit partners on the audit committee who are affiliated (AFAPs) and unaffiliated (UFAPs) with the firm's external auditor. We find a negative association between AFAPs and UFAPs on the audit committee and ICDs. We also find results that suggest the NYSE and NASDAQ three-year “cooling-off” rule applying to AFAPs may be unwarranted and deserves further empirical and regulatory attention. Further tests suggest AFAPs do not allow management to circumvent the disclosure of ICDs when conditions appear to suggest this may be so, and that AFAPs are negatively related to performance-adjusted discretionary accruals. Collectively, we interpret these findings to suggest that AFAPs and UFAPs on the audit committee are associated with more effective monitoring of internal controls and financial reporting.

In this study, we predict and provide evidence that distressed firms that rely more heavily on major customers for sales have a comparatively higher incidence of receiving going‐concern opinions (GCOs). Moreover, we find that the effect of increased reliance on major customers is driven by firms that are more distressed. We also theorize that variations in key characteristics of the relationship between a distressed firm and its largest major customer are incrementally linked to GCOs, and present evidence consistent with this. Specifically, we find that the effect of greater reliance on major customers is driven by firms that are relatively smaller than their largest major customer. Additionally, we find that greater reliance on major customers is positively (negatively) associated with GCOs when firms are in a shorter (longer) relationship with their major customer and when firms have a different auditor to (same auditor as) the largest major customer. Overall, our study indicates that supply chain relationships are relevant business risks associated with auditors' going‐concern assessments.

This study examines how options trading affects the rate of return expected by investors, i.e., the implied cost of equity capital. Our cross-sectional analysis suggests that firms with listed options have lower implied cost of equity capital than firms without listed options, while the results from our temporal difference-in-differences analysis suggest that firms with listed options experience a significant decrease in their implied cost of equity capital relative to a matched sample of firms without listed options following an options listing. Moreover, we find that within firms that have listed options, firms with higher options trading volume are associated with lower implied cost of equity capital. These findings, which are robust to a wide range of additional tests, are consistent with the view that options trading improves the precision of information and reduces information asymmetry problems, resulting in lower expected return on equity. Data Availability: All data used in this study are publicly available from the sources identified in the paper.

This study examines whether the audit quality of Big 4 audit firms is affected by an audit office's proximity to more target universities for appointing staff auditors. We identify these target universities using a recruitment map of a Big 4 audit firm and unique office-level hiring data hand-collected from LinkedIn. Our findings suggest that audit offices closer to more of their key feeder schools and universities with accredited business schools are associated with higher audit quality, as observed by a lower likelihood of financial accounting misstatements. Our results are robust across alternative measures of labor market proximity and audit quality, and to a battery of sensitivity tests, including controlling for client firms' proximity to universities. Overall, our results suggest that audit offices benefit from being proximate to more key suppliers of staff auditors.

Spurred by the informational and disciplinary roles that the media fulfils, this study provides initial evidence on how higher media coverage is associated with a lower tendency of firms withholding bad news, proxied by stock price crash risk. Our main findings are robust to a battery of tests that account for endogeneity concerns including a difference-in-differences analysis based on newspaper closures that exogenously reduce media coverage and a regression-discontinuity design analysis based on the top band of Russell 2000 and lower band of Russell 1000 index stocks. Additional tests reveal that the negative relation between media coverage and stock price crash risk is concentrated within firms with more negative and novel news coverage and firms with higher litigation or reputation risks. We also find that media plays an important role in reducing future stock price crash risk when there is reduced monitoring by other external monitoring mechanisms such as external auditors, financial analysts, and institutional shareholders.

To address potential threats to auditor independence, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) requires the audit committee to pre-approve nonaudit services (NAS) procured from the auditor. However, the presence of a former audit firm partner (FAP) affiliated with the current auditor on the audit committee could undermine the audit committee's due diligence over the NAS pre-approval process. To alleviate such concerns, the Securities and Exchange Commission approved a three-year “cooling-off” period for appointing audit firm alumni as independent directors. Our analyses show that the presence of both affiliated and unaffiliated FAPs on audit committees does not lead to greater NAS procured from the auditor; rather, FAPs reduce NAS procured from the auditor. Moreover, NAS decline significantly following the appointment of FAPs to the audit committee. Further tests suggest the three-year cooling-off period may not be warranted and deserves further investigation. Our study raises important implications for regulators, policy makers, corporate boards, and future research. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from sources identified in the text.

We examine whether and how firms structure their merger and acquisition deals to avoid antitrust scrutiny. There are approximately 40% more mergers and acquisitions (M&As) than expected just below deal value thresholds that trigger antitrust review. These “stealth acquisitions” tend to involve financial and governance contract terms that afford greater scope for negotiating and assigning lower deal values. We also show that the equity values, gross margins, and product prices of acquiring firms and their competitors increase following such acquisitions. Our results suggest that acquirers manipulate M&As to avoid antitrust scrutiny, thereby benefiting their own shareholders but potentially harming other corporate stakeholders.

This study shows how professional ties assist directors in gaining future board positions when their reputation is tainted by accounting fraud. We demonstrate that the influence of professional ties is more prominent for directors who are more heavily impacted by fraud. This effect is also stronger when directors share professional ties with key board members in the appointing firms. Additional tests show that appointments of these directors are associated with more favorable market reactions compared to appointments of other tainted directors. We also find that firms’ financial reporting quality improves after appointing professionally connected tainted directors.

This study examines how movements in a firm’s exposure to foreign exchange (forex) rates affect the properties of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Our results suggest that analysts’ forecast errors and dispersion increase with an increase in forex exposure within firms. These findings are robust to a wide range of robustness tests, including a quasi-experimental setting based on the sudden unpegging of the U.S. Dollar against the Chinese Yuan. Additional tests reveal that analysts spend more effort forecasting when firms experience an increase in forex exposure. Consistent with an increase in uncertainty of firm outcomes representing the primary channel through which forex exposure affects analysts’ forecasts, we find that the effect of forex exposure is heightened in the presence of greater volatility in the U.S. Dollar. However, we also find that more readable annual reports and higher media coverage can help improve the quality of analysts’ forecast properties for firms with increasing forex exposure. We also present evidence of some benefits analysts can realize from coverage of high forex exposure firms through generating greater stock trading and securing positions in more prestigious brokerage firms.