Auditing, Auditor Judgment, Dilution effect, Accountability

Previous work on hypothesis generation demonstrates that auditors tend to generate frequently occurring financial statement errors as their initial hypotheses to explain unexpected fluctuations. However, such work does not examine how the initially generated hypothesis affects subsequent performance at identifying an actual error. We hypothesized that the initially generated hypothesis would interfere with an auditor's ability to subsequently switch to a different hypothesis. Thus, if the initial hypothesis were incorrect, auditors would find it difficult to switch hypotheses in order to identify an actual error. Moreover, initially generating a frequent error would exacerbate this difficulty. Auditor‐subjects were asked to generate an initial error hypothesis after seeing a pattern of fluctuations in which sales and accounts receivable were overstated. After they generated their initial hypothesis, half of the subjects were provided with additional information that was consistent with a very frequent error (sales cutoff) and the other half were provided with information consistent with an infrequent error (sales recorded twice). As expected, we found that initially generating the very frequent error (i.e., sales cutoff) versus some other less frequent error affected auditors' subsequent performance at identifying actual errors. Specifically, auditors who generated the very frequent error as their initial hypothesis performed best when it was the actual error, but performed worst when the infrequent error was the actual error. In contrast, auditors who generated a less frequent error as their initial hypothesis performed moderately well (i.e., between best and worst) both when the actual error was frequent and when it was infrequent. The implications of these results for audit efficiency and effectiveness are discussed.

Résumé. Les travaux antérieurs qui ont porté sur la formulation d'hypothèses démontrent que les vérificateurs ont tendance, dans la formulation de leurs hypothèses initiales, à attribuer les fluctuations imprévues aux erreurs qui se produisent fréquemment dans les états financiers. L'on ne s'interroge cependant pas, dans ces travaux, sur la nature de l'incidence des hypothèses initiales sur la performance subséquente dans le diagnostic de l'erreur véritable. Les auteurs avancent que l'hypothèse formulée au départ et la capacité des vérificateurs de passer par la suite à une hypothèse différente interfèrent. Si, par exemple, l'hypothèse initiale était inexacte, il serait difficile pour les vérificateurs de changer d'hypothèse dans le diagnostic de l'erreur véritable. Plus encore, le fait d'invoquer initialement une erreur fréquente exacerberait cette difficulté. L'on a demandé aux vérificateurs‐sujets de produire une hypothèse initiale relative à l'erreur après avoir pris connaissance d'un modèle de fluctuations dans lequel les ventes et les comptes clients étaient surévalués. Une fois formulée leur hypothèse initiale, la moitié des sujets recevaient de l'information supplémentaire révélant l'existence d'une erreur très fréquente (dans la démarcation des ventes) et l'autre moitié recevaient de l'information révélant l'existence d'une erreur peu fréquente (celle de la double comptabilisation d'une même vente). Conformément à leurs prévisions, les auteurs constatent que le fait, pour les vérificateurs, d'invoquer initialement l'erreur très fréquente (soit la démarcation des ventes) par rapport à une autre erreur moins fréquente avait par la suite une incidence sur leur performance dans le diagnostic des erreurs véritables. Plus précisément, les vérificateurs qui invoquaient l'erreur très fréquente dans leur hypothèse initiale obtenaient les meilleurs résultats lorsque cette erreur était l'erreur véritable, mais ils obtenaient les résultats les moins bons lorsque l'erreur peu fréquente se trouvait être l'erreur véritable. Les vérificateurs qui invoquaient une erreur moins fréquente dans leur hypothèse initiale affichaient, pour leur part, une performance relativement bonne (c'est‐à‐dire se situant entre la performance la meilleure et la performance la moins bonne), aussi bien lorsque l'erreur véritable était fréquente que lorsqu'elle était peu fréquente. Les auteurs analysent les conséquences de ces résultats sur l'efficience et l'efficacité de la vérification.

ABSTRACT Prior research suggests that audit seniors' judgments are sometimes biased by their affect toward (i.e., feeling of personally liking or disliking) client personnel. We examine how experienced audit reviewers respond when reviewing an audit preparer's judgment that appears to be biased by the preparer's affect toward a client's controller. In our experiment, reviewers are provided with a preparer's judgment that appears inconsistent with the audit workpapers. We then examine the effect of providing versus not providing reviewers with a cue about the preparer's positive or negative affect toward the controller. We find that despite reviewers' belief that affect biases a preparer's judgment, reviewers who are informed of the preparer's affect do not rely less on the preparer's judgment. Instead, they actually rely more on the preparer's judgment than do those who are not informed about the preparer's affect. This result is consistent with Wegner's (1994) ironic rebound effect, which predicts that sometimes when individuals are trying not to rely on information, they ironically rely on it more. Our findings suggest a potential limitation of the audit review process.

ABSTRACT: The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board recently reported that its inspections show that auditors fail to effectively modify their standard audit procedures in response to fraud risk. Prior academic research is consistent with this finding. Our study examines the effects of two interventions on auditors' planning decisions in a high-fraud-risk setting: strategic reasoning and brainstorming in groups. Both interventions are predicted to lead auditors to more effectively modify their planned audit procedures. We use a panel of fraud experts to identify effective modifications to the audit plan of a specific fraud case. The experts' recommendations are then used to evaluate the effectiveness of practicing auditors' audit plans with and without the two interventions. We predict and find that each intervention leads to more effective modifications to the standard audit procedures and that the combination of the interventions is not significantly more effective than either intervention used alone.

ABSTRACT Conventional economics assumes workers provide the same effort under penalty contracts and economically equivalent bonus contracts. However, prior research finds that although workers prefer bonus contracts, they provide more effort under penalty contracts. Given these findings, the prevalence of bonus contracts in practice is puzzling. If penalty contracts yield more worker effort, why would employers not use them more often? We conduct experimental labor markets to test whether the prior finding of more effort under penalty contracts than bonus contracts (i.e., the contract frame effect) persists when workers can choose their contract and know that their employer intentionally offered the contract they choose. As predicted, these features of labor markets eliminate the difference in effort between penalty and bonus contracts reported in prior studies. This finding suggests employers may use bonus contracts more often than penalty contracts because they can offer the contract most workers prefer without sacrificing worker effort.

ABSTRACT We conduct an experiment in the securities-based crowdfunding setting to investigate whether some investors avoid accounting information for psychological reasons, even when they understand the information is useful in their decision-making. Results suggest investors who experience relatively more psychological discomfort when working with quantitative information are relatively less likely to acquire the financial statements of a potential crowdfunding investment. Importantly, this effect is incremental to any effect of investors' quantitative ability (i.e., their numeracy) and attenuates with an intervention designed to help investors overcome their psychological discomfort. Altogether, the results extend our understanding of the theory of information avoidance, provide a behavioral explanation for investors' documented underuse of accounting information, and can inform regulators as they revise crowdfunding regulations. JEL Classifications: G11; G41; M41.

ABSTRACT: Auditors often receive summary information or conclusions from management about account balances or internal controls. They must then gather evidence to assess whether this information is fairly stated. In such situations, management can be considered the “first mover” and the auditor the “second mover.” When auditors are the second mover, they are vulnerable to the curse of knowledge bias—the inability to ignore previously processed information (Fischhoff 1977). Specifically, because information from management could be incorrect or biased, auditors must arrive at an independent evaluation of the item in question (e.g., year-end book values, accounting estimates, or internal controls). This study examines the general issue of auditors being “second movers” by investigating how their awareness of management’s severity classifications of internal control problems influences auditors’ initial assessments of internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) under Auditing Standard No. 2. Our experimental design allows us to determine that management’s “first mover” influence on auditors’ judgments is an unintentional cognitive effect, rather than an intentional use of management’s classifications. We further examine whether cognitively restructuring the ICFR assessment task reduces management’s influence on auditors’ judgments by asking auditors to evaluate and explicitly document the likelihood and magnitude of the effect of an ICFR problem on the financial statements. We find that cognitively restructuring the task mitigates management’s “first mover” influence on auditors’ judgments.