Recent studies show that the transfer of corporate governance structure across borders has significant valuation consequences. It is equally important to consider the valuation effect of state expropriation risk as well as its interaction with quality of corporate governance. Using a sample of cross-border acquisitions during 1989–2009, we find that targets, which operate under some degree of state expropriation risk, receive a significantly lower premium. The target shareholders are not fully rewarded for the improvement in firm governance since the benefits of improvement are mitigated under predation. Our results provide evidence for twin-agency theory of Stulz (2005) through cross-border mergers.

We develop an international asset pricing model to measure the impact of investability constraints on asset pricing. For a sample of 18 emerging markets, we use Standard & Poor’s investable weight factor (IWF) to show a 26.33% reduction in the cost of equity capital when non-investable firms become partially investable, with a further 12.51% reduction when partially investable firms become unrestricted. We demonstrate the generality and usefulness of the IWF by examining stocks with global/American depositary receipts and foreign institutional holdings as alternate investability proxies. Our results provide strong evidence of the economic benefits of market liberalization policies.

We analyze the impact of both purchasing power parity (PPP) deviations and market segmentation on asset pricing and investor's portfolio holdings. The freely traded securities command a world market risk premium and an inflation risk premium. The securities that can be held by only a subset of investors command two additional premiums: a conditional market risk premium and a segflation risk premium. Our model is empirically supported with important implications for tests of international asset pricing.

This paper investigates the impact of capital flow restrictions on the pricing of securities, on the optimal portfolio composition for investors of different nationalities, and on their welfare. Under capital flow controls, the equilibrium price of a security is determined jointly by its international and national risk premiums, and investors acquire nationality-specific portfolios along with a market-wide proxy for the world market portfolio. Removal of investment barriers generally leads to an increase in the aggregate market value of the affected securities, and all investors favor a move toward market integration. Introduction of different types of index funds in the world market generally increases world market integration and investor welfare.

This paper investigates the impact of capital flow restrictions on the pricing of securities, on the optimal portfolio composition for investors of different nationalities, and on their welfare. Under capital flow controls, the equilibrium price of a security is determined jointly by its international and national risk premiums, and investors acquire nationality‐specific portfolios along with a market‐wide proxy for the world market portfolio. Removal of investment barriers generally leads to an increase in the aggregate market value of the affected securities, and all investors favor a move toward market integration. Introduction of different types of index funds in the world market generally increases world market integration and investor welfare.

This paper conducts a theoretical and empirical investigation of the pricing (and portfolio) implications of investment barriers in the context of international capital markets. The postulated market structure—labelled “mildly segmented”—leads to the existence of “super” risk premiums for a subset of securities and to a breakdown of the standard separation result. The empirical study uses an extended data base including LDC markets and provides tentative support for the mild segmentation hypothesis.

We study privatization under moral hazard and adverse selection. We show that if the fraction of efficient investors is either insignificant or productivity differences between efficient and inefficient investors are negligible, the government would offer a pooling contract and sell the same fraction of equity to both types of investors. The lower the productivity difference, the greater the equity stake offered to investors. On the other hand, if the fraction of efficient investors is significant or productivity differentials are large, the optimal policy consists of a dual method of privatization in which it offers two methods of privatization to outside investors. The first method consists of a sale of 100% equity together with a subsidy and charges higher price. Under the second option, the investor pays a smaller price but buys less than 100% equity without any subsidy. Efficient investors opt for the first method while inefficient investors prefer the second. The dual privatization method screens investors and provides them with maximum incentives to invest while minimizing the risk of post-privatization bankruptcy.

International asset pricing models suggest that barriers to portfolio flows and availability of market substitutes affect the degree and time variation of world market integration. We use GARCH-in-mean methodology to assess the evolution in market integration for eight emerging markets over the period 1977–2000. Our results suggest that while local risk is still a relevant factor in explaining time variation of emerging market returns, none of the countries appear to be completely segmented. We find that there are substantial crossmarket differences in the degree of integration. The evolution toward more integrated financial markets is apparent although at times we do observe reversals. In addition, we provide clear evidence on the impropriety of directly using correlations of market-wide index returns as a measure of market integration. Finally, financial market development and financial liberalization policies play important roles in integrating emerging markets.