[The Investment Company Act of 1940 restricts interfund lending and borrowing within a mutual fund family, but families can apply for regulatory exemptions to participate in such transactions. We find that the monitoring mechanisms and investment restrictions influence the family’s decision to apply for the interfund lending programs. We document several benefits of such programs for equity funds. First, participating funds reduce cash holdings and increase investments in illiquid assets. Second, fund investors exhibit less runlike behavior. Third, it helps mitigate asset fire sales after extreme investor redemptions. Offsetting these benefits, money market funds in participating families experience investor outflows.]

This article characterizes the systematic risk exposures of hedge funds using buy-and-hold and option-based strategies. Our results show that a large number of equity-oriented hedge fund strategies exhibit payoffs resembling a short position in a put option on the market index and therefore bear significant left-tail risk, risk that is ignored by the commonly used mean-variance framework. Using a mean-conditional value-at-risk framework, we demonstrate the extent to which the mean-variance framework underestimates the tail risk. Finally, working with the systematic risk exposures of hedge funds, we show that their recent performance appears significantly better than their long-run performance.

Pressure from institutional money managers to generate profits in the short run is often blamed for corporate myopia. Theoretical research suggests that money managers’ shortterm focus stems from their career concerns and greater fund transparency can amplify these concerns. Using a difference-in-differences design around a regulatory shock that increased the transparency of fund managers’ portfolio choices, we examine whether increased transparency encourages myopic corporate investment behavior. We find that corporate innovation declines following the regulatory shock. Moreover, evidence from mutual fund trading behavior corroborates that the increased short-term focus of money managers drives the results.

The Investment Company Act of 1940 restricts interfund lending and borrowing within a mutual fund family, but families can apply for regulatory exemptions to participate in such transactions. We find that the monitoring mechanisms and investment restrictions influence the family’s decision to apply for the interfund lending programs. We document several benefits of such programs for equity funds. First, participating funds reduce cash holdings and increase investments in illiquid assets. Second, fund investors exhibit less run-like behavior. Third, it helps mitigate asset fire sales after extreme investor redemptions. Offsetting these benefits, money market funds in participating families experience investor outflows. Received May 26, 2018; editorial decision November 27, 2018 by Editor Itay Goldstein.

[For funds with high incentives and more opportunities to inflate returns, we find that (i) returns during December are significantly higher than returns during the rest of the year, even after controlling for risk in both the time series and the cross-section; and (ii) this December spike is greater than for funds with lower incentives and fewer opportunities to inflate returns. These results suggest that hedge funds manage their returns upward in an opportunistic fashion in order to earn higher fees. Finally, we find strong evidence that funds inflate December returns by underreporting returns earlier in the year but only weak evidence that funds borrow from January returns in the following year.]

Using a comprehensive hedge fund database, we examine the role of managerial incentives and discretion in hedge fund performance. Hedge funds with greater managerial incentives, proxied by the delta of the option-like incentive fee contracts, higher levels of managerial ownership, and the inclusion of high-water mark provisions in the incentive contracts, are associated with superior performance. The incentive fee percentage rate by itself does not explain performance. We also find that funds with a higher degree of managerial discretion, proxied by longer lockup, notice, and redemption periods, deliver superior performance. These results are robust to using alternative performance measures and controlling for different data-related biases.

We examine liquidity transformation by funds of hedge funds (FoFs) by developing a new measure, illiquidity gap, that captures the mismatch between the liquidity of their portfolios and the liquidity available to their investors. We find that higher liquidity transformation is driven by FoFs’ incentives to attract more capital and earn higher compensation. Greater liquidity transformation is associated with higher exposure to investor runs and worse performance during crisis periods. Finally, FoFs mitigate the risks associated with liquidity transformation by maintaining higher cash buffers.

Since hedge funds specify significant lock-up periods, we investigate persistence in the performance of hedge funds using a multi-period framework in which the likelihood of observing persistence by chance is lower than in the traditional two-period framework. Under the null hypothesis of no manager skill (no persistence), the theoretical distribution of observing wins or losses follows a binormial distribution. We test this hypothesis using the traditional two-period framework and compare the findings with the results obtained using our multi-period framework. We examine whether persistence is sensitive to the length of return measurement intervals by using quarterly, half-yearly and yearly returns. We find maximum persistence at the quarterly horizon indicating that presistence among hedge fund managers is short term in nature.

Using rich data on familial background of US mutual fund managers, this paper sheds light on the formation of risk preferences by investigating birth order effects. Consistent with sensation-seeking behavior, we find that managers who are born later in the sibling hierarchy take more risks but perform worse relative to lower-birth-order managers. Later-born managers take more extreme style bets, hold more lottery stocks, churn their portfolios more, and engage in more civil and regulatory violations. These birth-order effects are more pronounced when parental resources are limited and age spacing is lower between siblings, suggesting sibling rivalry as a potential mechanism.

This article characterizes the systematic risk exposures of hedge funds using buy-and-hold and option-based strategies. Our results show that a large number of equity-oriented hedge fund strategies exhibit payoffs resembling a short position in a put option on the market index and therefore bear significant left-tail risk, risk that is ignored by the commonly used mean-variance framework. Using a mean-conditional value-at-risk framework, we demonstrate the extent to which the mean-variance framework underestimates the tail risk. Finally, working with the systematic risk exposures of hedge funds, we show that their recent performance appears significantly better than their long-run performance.