Nonbank financial intermediaries (NBFIs) have grown significantly relative to banks. We argue that this growth reflects a transformation of the activities and risks of banks and NBFIs, driven at least in part by changes in bank regulation. We document through new regulatory data, case studies, and empirical analyses that banks remain special as providers of both routine and emergency liquidity to NBFIs and that the sectors have become increasingly interdependent. We discuss some potential regulatory responses, including considering the two sectors holistically and exploring new ways to internalize the costs of systemic risk arising from bank-NBFI interconnectedness.

[As the number of bank failures increases, the set of assets available for acquisition by surviving banks enlarges but the total liquidity available with surviving banks falls. This results in "cash-in-the-market" pricing for liquidation of banking assets. At a sufficiently large number of bank failures, and in turn, at a sufficiently low level of asset prices, there are too many banks to liquidate and inefficient users of assets who are liquidity-endowed may end up owning the liquidated assets. In order to avoid this allocation inefficiency, it may be ex-post optimal for the regulator to bail out some failed banks. We show, however, that there exists a policy that involves granting liquidity to surviving banks in the purchase of failed banks, which is equivalent to the bailout policy from an ex-post standpoint. Crucially, this liquidity provision policy gives banks incentives to differentiate, rather than to herd, makes aggregate banking crises less likely, and thereby dominates the bailout policy from an ex-ante standpoint.]

Systemic risk is modeled as the endogenously chosen correlation of returns on assets held by banks. The limited liability of banks and the presence of a negative externality of one bank’s failure on the health of other banks give rise to a systemic risk-shifting incentive where all banks undertake correlated investments, thereby increasing economy-wide aggregate risk. Regulatory mechanisms such as bank closure policy and capital adequacy requirements that are commonly based only on a bank’s own risk fail to mitigate aggregate risk-shifting incentives, and can, in fact, accentuate systemic risk. Prudential regulation is shown to operate at a collective level, regulating each bank as a function of both its joint (correlated) risk with other banks as well as its individual (bank-specific) risk.

We develop a theory of income and payout smoothing by firms when insiders know more about income than outside shareholders, but property rights ensure that outsiders can enforce a fair payout. Insiders set payout to meet outsiders' expectations and underproduce to manage future expectations downward. The observed income and payout process are smooth and adjust partially and over time in response to economic shocks. The smaller the inside ownership, the more severe underproduction is, resulting in an "outside equity Laffer curve."

[What determines the sustainability of sovereign debt? We develop a model where myopic governments seek popularity but can nevertheless commit credibly to service external debt. They do not default when debt is low because they would lose access to debt markets and be forced to reduce spending; they do not default as debt builds up and net new borrowing becomes difficult, because of the adverse consequences from default to the domestic financial sector. More myopic governments default less often, but tax in a more distortionary way and increase the vulnerability of the domestic financial sector to future government debt default.]

[We argue that when bankruptcy code is creditor friendly, excessive liquidations cause levered firms to shun innovation, whereas by promoting continuation upon failure, a debtorfriendly code induces greater innovation. We provide empirical support for this claim by employing patents as a proxy for innovation. Using time-series changes within a country and cross-country variation in creditor rights, we confirm that a creditor-friendly code leads to a lower absolute level of innovation by firms, as well as relatively lower innovation by firms in technologically innovative industries. When creditor rights are stronger, technologically innovative industries employ relatively less leverage and grow disproportionately slower.]

This paper analyzes corporate bond valuation and optimal call and default rules when interest rates and firm value are stochastic. It then uses the results to explain the dynamics of hedging. Bankruptcy rules are important determinants of corporate bond sensitivity to interest rates and firm value. Although endogenous and exogenous bankruptcy models can be calibrated to produce the same prices, they can have very different hedging implications. We show that empirical results on the relation between corporate spreads and Treasury rates provide evidence on duration, and we find that the endogenous model explains the empirical patterns better than do typical exogenous models.

Data on firm-loan-level daily credit line drawdowns in the United States expose a corporate “dash for cash” induced by the COVID-19 pandemic. In the first phase of the crisis, which was characterized by extreme precaution and heightened aggregate risk, all firms drew down bank credit lines and raised cash levels. In the second phase, which followed the adoption of stabilization policies, only the highest-rated firms switched to capital markets to raise cash. Consistent with the risk of becoming a fallen angel, the lowest-quality BBB-rated firms behaved more similarly to non-investment grade firms. The observed corporate behavior reveals the significant impact of credit risk on corporate cash holdings. (JEL G01, G14, G32, G35) Received July 13, 2020; editorial decision July 17, 2020 by Editor Andrew Ellul

While the too-big-to-fail guarantee is explicitly a part of bank regulation in many countries, this paper shows that bank closure policies also suffer from an implicit “too-many-to-fail” problem: when the number of bank failures is large, the regulator finds it ex-post optimal to bail out some or all failed banks, whereas when the number of bank failures is small, failed banks can be acquired by the surviving banks. This gives banks incentives to herd and increases the risk that many banks may fail together. The ex-post optimal regulation may thus be time-inconsistent or sub-optimal from an ex-ante standpoint. In contrast to the too-big-to-fail problem which mainly affects large banks, we show that the too-many-to-fail problem affects small banks more by giving them stronger incentives to herd.

We study the liquidity demand of large settlement banks in the UK and its effect on the money markets before and during the subprime crisis of 2007–08. We find that the liquidity demand of large settlement banks experienced a 30% increase in the period immediately following August 9 2007, the day when money markets froze, igniting the crisis. Following this shift, liquidity demand had a precautionary nature in that it rose on days of high payment activity and for banks with greater credit risk. This caused overnight interbank rates to rise, an effect virtually absent in the precrisis period.