This article develops a model, with deferred compensation and severance pay, that predicts that workers bear all the costs and receive all the returns of human capital investments and that specific investments yield higher returns than general investments. This model also predicts that pensions, which efficiently defer compensation, will be positively related to specific investments. Evidence from the National Longitudinal Survey of Older Men confirms these predictions; participation in company-sponsored training programs, proxying for specific investments, increases the probability of pension receipt and the level of benefits. More general training outside the firm has much smaller effects on pensions.

In a sample of 111 MBO offers between 1984 and 1987, almost 30% attract new blockholders. These blockholders are primarily professional investors who act to facilitate a takeover by a higher bidder, thus increasing returns to both themselves and other public shareholders. In contrast, I find little evidence that pre-existing blockholders, particularly institutional holders, affect either the offer outcome or actively participate in the buyout contest once it begins. The overall pattern of results suggests that professional investors, particularly equity-holding companies, are ‘control specialists’ who provide valuable services as brokers in the market for corporate control.

This paper describes the application ofthe Principle of Maximum Entropy to the estimation of the distribution of an underlying asset from a set of option prices. The resulting distri? bution is least committal with respect to unknown or missing information and is, hence, the least prejudiced. The maximum entropy distribution is the only information about the asset that can be inferred from the price data alone. An extension to the Principle of Mini? mum Cross-Entropy allows the inclusion of prior knowledge of the asset distribution. We show that the maximum entropy distribution is able to accurately fit a known density, given simulated option prices at different strikes.

[This article studies the design and valuation of debt contracts in a general dynamic setting under uncertainty. We incorporate some insights of the recent corporate finance literature into a valuation framework. The basic framework is an extensive form game determined by the terms of a debt contract and applicable bankruptcy laws. Debtholders and equityholders behave noncooperatively. The firm's reorganization boundary is determined endogenously. Strategic debt service results in significantly higher default premia at even small liquidation costs. Deviations from absolute priority and forced liquidations occur along the equilibrium path. The design tends to stress higher coupons and sinking funds when firms have a higher cash payout ratio.]

[We analyze a competitive model in which different information signals get reflected in value at different points in time. If investors are sufficiently risk averse, we obtain an equilibrium in which all investors focus exclusively on the short term. In addition, we show that increasing the variance of informationless trading increases market depth but causes a greater proportion of investors to focus on the short-term signal, which decreases the informativeness of prices about the long run. Finally, we also explore parameter spaces under which long-term informed agents wish to voluntarily disclose their information.]

Walter Nonneman, Patrick Vanhoudt; A Further Augmentation of the Solow Model and the Empirics of Economic Growth for OECD Countries*, The Quarterly Journal of E

This paper considers hypothesis tests when the parameter space is restricted under the alternative hypothesis. Multivariate one-sided tests are a leading example. The likelihood ratio (LR) test is shown to be admissible and to maximize power against alternatives that are arbitrarily distant from the null hypothesis. Exact results are established first for Gaussian linear regression models with known variance. Asymptotic analogues are then established for dynamic nonlinear models.

This article analyzes intraday patterns for U.K. and U.S. trading of British cross-listed stocks. For each market, the intraday patterns for these stocks closely resemble those of otherwise similar, non-cross-listed stocks. There is a 2-hour period each day when cross-listed stocks are traded both in New York and in London. This overlap is characterized by concentrated trading as private information, originating in New York, gets incorporated into prices in both markets. Cross-border competition for orderflow tends to reduce already declining spreads in London. By contrast, New York specialists maintain high spreads during the overlap. Overall, the evidence indicates that order flow for cross-listed securities is segmented.

[This article analyzes intraday patterns for U.K. and U.S. trading of British cross-listed stocks. For each market, the intraday patterns for these stocks closely resemble those of otherwise similar, non-cross-listed stocks. There is a 2-hour period each day when cross-listed stocks are traded both in New York and in London. This overlap is characterized by concentrated trading as private information, originating in New York, gets incorporated into prices in both markets. Cross-border competition for orderflow tends to reduce already declining spreads in London. By contrast, New York specialists maintain high spreads during the overlap. Overall, the evidence indicates that order flow for cross-listed securities is segmented.]