A number of recent policy initiatives have called for enhanced transparency of banking firms. While the hope is that enhanced transparency may improve incentives ex ante, it is less clear whether transparency is necessarily a good thing ex post, when a bank might have hit hard times and provision of information could have a destabilising effect. This paper provides a synopsis of these different effects and provides some new, bank-level evidence in an attempt to clarify empirically whether, taking ex ante and ex post effects together, transparency is likely to reduce or increase bank stability. The analysis suggests that, on balance, transparency reduces the chance of severe banking problems and thus enhances overall financial stability.

This paper examines how financial markets responded to the longest circuit breaker in American financial history: the four-month suspension of trading on the New York Stock Exchange following the outbreak of World War I. The suspension that began on July 31, 1914 fostered a substitute trading forum called the New Street market. Trading on New Street began almost immediately and offered economically meaningful liquidity services despite its impaired price transparency. A simple cross-sectional model of bid–ask spreads on New Street demonstrates that New Street liquidity responded to economic incentives. New Street's success implies that, from a public policy perspective, expensive back-up trading facilities are not required to preserve liquidity during a trading suspension in established markets. Back-up records of share ownership and transfer facilities, however, are crucial to maintaining liquidity.

Abstract Popular investment advice recommends that stock/bond and stock/wealth ratios should rise with investor risk tolerance and investment horizon respectively, prescriptions that are difficult to reconcile with the simple mean-variance model. We show that extending the mean-variance model to include human capital, without any other modifications, can simultaneously justify both recommendations, so long as the correlation between labour income and stock returns falls within a range determined by market and investor-specific parameters. Aggregate labour income data from 11 countries generally satisfy this requirement, as do plausible individual income processes. We also consider the implications of human capital for the optimal bond/wealth ratio over the investment horizon, and examine the sensitivity of the stock/bond mix to the volatility of labour income.

This article develops and estimates a model of wage determination that isolates the effects of alcohol use on wages as mediated through human capital accumulation. Although generally insignificant, estimation results suggest that moderate alcohol use while in school or working has a positive effect on the returns to education or experience, and therefore on human capital accumulation, but heavier drinking reduces this gain slightly. Based on these results, alcohol use does not appear to adversely affect returns to education or work experience and therefore has no negative effect on the efficiency of education or experience in forming human capital.

Abstract This paper uses stock market data to investigate the popular claim that investors are misled by the “pro forma” earnings numbers conspicuously featured in the press releases of some U.S. firms. We first document the frequency and magnitude of pro forma earnings in press releases issued during June through August 2000, and describe the 433 firms that engaged in this financial disclosure strategy. Our test period predates public expressions of concern by trade associations and regulators that pro forma earnings may mislead investors and the subsequent issuance of guidelines and rules on the disclosure of pro forma earnings numbers. We use two complementary approaches to determine whether the share prices that investors assign to pro forma firms are systematically higher than the prices assigned to other firms. Our market‐multiples tests for differences in price levels find some evidence suggesting that pro forma firms may be priced higher than firms that do not use the disclosure strategy. This apparent overpricing is not, however, related to the pro forma earnings numbers themselves. Our narrow‐window stock returns tests reveal no evidence of a stock return premium for pro forma firms at the quarterly earnings announcement date. Collectively, the results cast doubt on the notion that investors are, on average, misled by pro forma earnings disclosures despite the widespread concern expressed in the financial press and by regulators.

This study examines online multi-unit, discriminatory, ascending auctions of certificates of deposit. We find evidence suggesting that the most aggressive bids are likely to occur at the beginning and the end of the auctions. The opening of the auction serves an important role in price discovery. In addition, in multi-unit auctions last-minute bidding is a conditional strategy, and is used only when bidding is intense. Furthermore, we provide evidence suggesting that revenues are increasing in the depth of the market, in the concentration of early bids, and in bank participation relative to the size of the principal.

ABSTRACT Previous research provides evidence that, for the clients of a large audit firm, audit clients with higher perceived business risk bear the expected costs of this risk with higher audit fees. We extend the literature, which focuses on the relation between litigation risk and audit fees, by examining alleged client misconduct that is not illegal but possibly increases business risk. In particular, we examine the relation between audit fees and business risk for audit clients doing business in developing countries where bribery of top government officials has been an accepted business practice. We hypothesize that bribery‐paying clients are riskier because of both client business risk and audit business risk. Using data collected from Securities and Exchange Commission filings and audit fee data in the 1970s, before the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, we provide evidence that audit fees were higher for clients that disclosed paying bribes. This evidence is consistent with an audit market where auditors assess business risk at the client level, then pass their expected costs to the client in the form of higher audit fees.

This paper examines the policy issues associated with resolving the possible failure of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac (housing enterprises). It compares and contrasts these issues with those raised in the context of large bank failures and also identifies important differences in the extant supervisory authorities. Based on these discussions, a number of policy suggestions are offered to minimize the cost of resolution and protect taxpayers from loss should a large bank or housing enterprise fail.

This paper considers regression models for cross-section data that exhibit cross-section dependence due to common shocks, such as macroeconomic shocks. The paper analyzes the properties of least squares (LS) estimators in this context. The results of the paper allow for any form of cross-section dependence and heterogeneity across population units. The probability limits of the LS estimators are determined, and necessary and sufficient conditions are given for consistency. The asymptotic distributions of the estimators are found to be mixed normal after recentering and scaling. The t, Wald, and F statistics are found to have asymptotic standard normal, χ2, and scaled χ2 distributions, respectively, under the null hypothesis when the conditions required for consistency of the parameter under test hold. However, the absolute values of t, Wald, and F statistics are found to diverge to infinity under the null hypothesis when these conditions fail. Confidence intervals exhibit similarly dichotomous behavior. Hence, common shocks are found to be innocuous in some circumstances, but quite problematic in others. Models with factor structures for errors and regressors are considered. Using the general results, conditions are determined under which consistency of the LS estimators holds and fails in models with factor structures. The results are extended to cover heterogeneous and functional factor structures in which common factors have different impacts on different population units.