We exploit exogenous variation in the scheduling of gubernatorial elections to study the timing of bank failure in the US. Using hazard analysis, we show that bank failure is about 45% less likely in the year leading up to an election. Political control (i.e., lack of competition) can explain all of this average election year fall in the hazard rate. In particular, we show that the reduction in hazard rate doubles in magnitude for banks operating in states where the governor has simultaneous control of the upper and lower houses of the state legislature (i.e., complete control) heading into an election.

This paper empirically examines limit order revisions and cancellations which contribute to a significant portion of the order activity in many order-driven markets. We document that limit orders are more likely to be revised or cancelled if they are large and near the bid-ask quote. We show that order revisions generate net economic benefits to traders. Our evidence shows strong links between these activities and limit order submission risk using bid-ask spread, volatility and post-event return as proxies. We also find that these activities are less intense when the opportunity cost to monitor a stock is high, such as during lunch hours or when stock volume relative to the entire market is low.

This study employs firm-specific announcements as a proxy for information flows and investigates the information–volatility relation using high-frequency data from the Australian Stock Exchange. Our analysis reveals a positive and significant impact of the arrival rate of the selected news variable on the conditional variance of stock returns, even after controlling for the potential effects of trading volume and high opening volatility. Furthermore, the inclusion of the news variable in the conditional variance equation of the generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic model also reduces volatility persistence, especially with intraday data. Combined with the evidence that news arrivals display a very strong pattern of autocorrelation, our results are consistent with the Mixture of Distribution Hypothesis, which attributes conditional heteroscedasticity of stock returns to time-dependence in the news arrival process.

We examine the nature of state blockholding across publicly listed firms in East Asia by assembling a unique dataset spanning 16 years and 9 economies. Our newly compiled data identifies ultimate owners for each firm annually between 1997 and 2012, totaling 2984 firm-year observations. Three findings stand out. First, large changes (>5%) to state blockholdings – both investments and divestments – are quite prevalent. Second, the identity of the largest shareholder frequently changes over time between state, family, and widely-held entities. Third, sovereign wealth funds are far more likely to acquire rather than sell large stakes in publicly traded firms.