Whether equity-based compensation and equity ownership align the interests of managers with stockholders is an important question in finance. Early studies found an inverted U-shaped relation between managerial ownership and firm value, but later studies using firm fixed effects found no relation. Managerial ownership levels change very slowly over time which may mask an ownership effect on firm value when using a fixed effect model. This is due to a much smaller within firm variation than between firm variation. We demonstrate that using pay-performance semi-elasticity, rather than pay-performance sensitivity as a measure of managerial ownership incentives, results in meaningful variation within firm over time. The greater within firm variation increases the power to detect a relation between managerial ownership and firm value with fixed effect regressions. As in the early research on this issue, we find a significant inverted U-shaped relation between managerial ownership and Tobin's Q in fixed effects regressions and after controlling for endogeneity with both two-stage and three-stage least squares regressions. Our results are consistent with incentive alignment at low levels and risk aversion at high levels of managerial ownership.

We examine the role of the board of directors, the audit committee, and the executive committee in preventing earnings management. Supporting an SEC Panel Report's conclusion that audit committee members need financial sophistication, we show that the composition of a board in general and of an audit committee more specifically, is related to the likelihood that a firm will engage in earnings management. Board and audit committee members with corporate or financial backgrounds are associated with firms that have smaller discretionary current accruals. Board and audit committee meeting frequency is also associated with reduced levels of discretionary current accruals. We conclude that board and audit committee activity and their members' financial sophistication may be important factors in constraining the propensity of managers to engage in earnings management.

This paper evaluates the stock market effects of events leading to the passage of the Financial Institutions Reforms, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989. The evidence suggests that the signing of the Act by President Bush produced positive abnormal returns for both banks and S&Ls and that the addition of tougher capital standards produced positive returns for S&Ls. In addition, the Act increased the risk of both banks and S&Ls.

In this paper, we extend the work of Ang et al. [J. Finance 55 (1999) 81] to large firms. We find that managerial ownership is positively related to asset utilization but does not serve as a significant deterrent to excessive discretionary expenses. Outside block ownership may only have a limited effect on reducing agency costs. Furthermore, smaller boards serve the same role, but independent outsiders on a board do not appear to protect the firm from agency costs. Thus, this paper reports complementary evidence to Ang, Cole and Lin. In large publicly traded corporations, managerial ownership significantly alleviates principal–agent conflicts even in the presence of other agency deterrent mechanisms.

This study examines the revaluation of shares surrounding the cancellation of mergers over the years 1976–1985. The results are first categorized according to the party cancelling the merger and then by subsequent merger activity. The results are as expected: target firms that become involved in merger activity, subsequent to the cancellation, experience positive cumulative prediction errors (CPEs). Targets that do not become involved in subsequent merger activity have CPEs that return to pre‐merger announcement levels. These results do not vary when bidders or targets cancel the merger.

We test whether the conversion price (ratio) is viewed by the stock market as a credible signal of the firm's future earnings prospects (Kim (1990)) and, subsequently, whether convertible debt serves as backdoor equity financing (Stein (1992)). Examining the conversion price in relation to current stock prices and a priori growth expectations produces an average expected time of less than 1.5 years for convertible bonds to be at-the-money. Thus, as Stein suggests, convertibles appear to be a method of drawing equity into a firm's capital structure. We also find that the size of the firm's announcement period abnormal returns is positively related to the expected time for the convertible to become at-the-money. Given these relationships, we conclude that convertible debt issue announcements, on average, send an equity-like signal to the market.

Using data from 35 futures options markets from eight separate exchanges, we test how well the implied volatilities (IVs) embedded in option prices predict subsequently realized volatility (RV) in the underlying futures. We find that for this broad array of futures options, IV performs well in a relative sense. For a large majority of the commodities studied, the implieds outperform historical volatility (HV) as a predictor of the subsequently RV in the underlying futures prices over the remaining life of the option. Indeed, in most markets examined, regardless of whether it is modeled as a simple moving average or in a GARCH framework, HV contains no economically significant predictive information beyond what is already incorporated in IV. These findings add to previous research that has focused on currency and crude oil futures by extending the analysis into a very broad array of contracts and exchanges. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that futures options markets in general, with their minimal trading frictions, are efficient.

Prior research has documented that volatility in financial asset markets is most directly related to trading rather than calendar days, and that there is an inverse asymmetric relation between volatility and returns in both stocks and long-term bonds. We examine these relations in 37 futures options markets representing a wide variety of asset types. Using futures prices and implied volatilities from this extensive array of markets, we confirm that in all of them, save one, market volatility is more directly related to trading days. However, the nature of the association between implied volatility and underlying asset returns varies greatly across asset categories and across exchanges. Thus, we show that findings from equity markets apparently are not generalizable to other asset classes.