This study investigates whether abnormal returns can be earned using public information about firms’ domestic and foreign earnings. The results indicate that the market understates foreign earnings’ persistence. As a result, it is possible to construct a zero-investment hedge portfolio that consistently earns positive returns across years. A disproportionate fraction of the positive abnormal returns to the long position is concentrated in the few days surrounding the subsequent year's quarterly earnings announcement dates. Furthermore, the abnormal returns do not appear to persist beyond the subsequent year. The results are consistent with market mispricing, and not mis-estimated risk.

In this article we investigate Japanese managers’ use of income from the sale of fixed assets and marketable securities to manage earnings. The earnings management target examined is Japanese managers’ forecasts of current–year earnings. We find a negative relation between income from asset sales and management forecast error. When current reported operating income is below (above) management's forecast of operating income, firms increase (decrease) earnings through the sale of fixed assets and marketable securities. The results hold after controlling for expected future performance, debt–to–equity ratio, size, growth, and last year's income from asset sales.

We find that analyst forecasts of earnings per share occur in nickel intervals at a much greater frequency than do actual earnings per share. Analysts who round their earnings per share forecasts to nickel intervals exhibit characteristics of analysts who are less informed, exert less effort, and have fewer resources. Rounded forecasts are less accurate and the negative relation between rounding and forecast accuracy increases as the rounding interval increases from nickel to dime, quarter, half-dollar, and dollar. An examination of announcement period returns reveals that market expectations more closely align with consensus forecasts including rounded forecasts and then correct toward the more accurate consensus forecasts excluding rounded forecasts. Finally, exclusion of rounded forecasts decreases forecast dispersion.

Accounting Standards Update No. 2016–02 (ASU 2016–02) generated considerable debate between managers and standard setters. We find evidence that after issuance of ASU 2016–02, lessee firms decreased their use of long-term operating leases, increased their use of short-term operating leases, and increased their use of capital expenditures. The shift from long-term operating leases to capital expenditures is more pronounced for firms that had greater reporting incentives to use operating leases prior to ASU 2016–02. However, we find no evidence that the change in leasing behavior leads to negative outcomes predicted by managers (i.e., no evidence of a decrease in reported firm performance, a decrease in firm value, increase in firm risk, decrease in credit ratings, increase in debt covenant violations, or decrease in employment). Our study adds to the literature on the real impacts of accounting standards on managers' investment behavior and economic consequences for lessee firms and their stakeholders.

This study tests the agency cost hypothesis in the context of geographic earnings disclosures. The agency cost hypothesis predicts that managers, when not monitored by shareholders, make self‐maximizing decisions that may not necessarily be in the best interest of shareholders. These decisions include aggressively growing the firm, which reduces profitability and destroys firm value. Geographic earnings disclosures provide an interesting context to examine this issue. Beginning with Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 131 (SFAS 131), most U.S. multinational firms are no longer required to disclose earnings by geographic area (e.g., net income in Mexico or net income in East Asia). Such nondisclosure potentially reduces the ability of shareholders to monitor managers' decisions related to foreign operations. Using a sample of U.S. multinationals with substantial foreign operations, we find that nondisclosing firms, relative to firms that continue to disclose geographic earnings, experience greater expansion of foreign sales, produce lower foreign profit margins, and have lower firm value in the post–SFAS 131 period. Our conclusions are strengthened by the fact that these differences do not exist in the pre–SFAS 131 period and do not relate to domestic operations. We find differences in the predicted direction only for foreign operations and only after adoption of SFAS 131. Our results are robust to the inclusion of an extensive set of control variables related to alternative corporate governance mechanisms, operating performance, and the firm's information environment. Overall, the results are consistent with the agency cost hypothesis and the important role of financial disclosures in monitoring managers.

Recent research provides evidence that the operating cash flows-to-price ratio subsumes accruals in explaining future annual returns. This suggests that the accrual anomaly is part of the overall value-glamour anomaly and does not represent the mispricing of earnings. We extend the literature by using multiple measures of abnormal accruals and separate analyses of future annual returns and future earnings announcement returns. The results reveal that the operating cash flows-to-price ratio does not subsume abnormal accruals in explaining future annual returns or future announcement returns. We also find that the operating cash flows-to-price ratio does not subsume total accruals in explaining future announcement returns. These results are not consistent with accruals being a manifestation of the value-glamour anomaly. Our study contributes to the current debate on the existence and the extent of the (abnormal) accrual anomaly. Moreover, the methodology employed can help researchers in exploring mispricing phenomena.

Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157 (FAS No. 157), Fair Value Measurements, prioritizes the source of information used in fair value measurements into three levels: (1) Level 1 (observable inputs from quoted prices in active markets), (2) Level 2 (indirectly observable inputs from quoted prices of comparable items in active markets, identical items in inactive markets, or other market-related information), and (3) Level 3 (unobservable, firm-generated inputs). Using quarterly reports of banking firms in 2008, we find that the value relevance of Level 1 and Level 2 fair values is greater than the value relevance of Level 3 fair values. In addition, we find evidence that the value relevance of fair values (especially Level 3 fair values) is greater for firms with strong corporate governance. Overall, our results support the relevance of fair value measurements under FAS No. 157, but weaker corporate governance mechanisms may reduce the relevance of these measures.

We test the ability of analyst characteristics to explain relative forecast accuracy across legal origins (common law versus civil law). Common‐law countries generally have more effective corporate governance mechanisms, including stronger investor protection laws and inputs provided through higher‐quality financial reporting systems. In this type of environment, we predict that analysts with superior ability and resources in common‐law countries will more consistently outperform their peers because appropriate market‐based incentives exist. In civil‐law countries, where the demand for earnings information is reduced because of weaker corporate governance mechanisms and lower‐quality financial reporting, we predict that analysts with superior ability will less consistently provide superior forecasts. Results are consistent with our expectations and suggest an association between legal and financial reporting environments and analysts' forecast behavior.

The purpose of this study is to highlight issues of interest to researchers employing the I/B/E/S earnings and forecast data. I/B/E/S has traditionally provided per share data on a split-adjusted basis, rounded to the nearest penny. In doing so, per share amounts are comparable over time. However, because not all prior forecasts and earnings per share amounts divide precisely to a penny, adjusting for stock splits and rounding to the nearest penny can cause a loss of information. Researchers are prohibited in many cases from determining the amounts actually reported in prior years, leading to misclassified observations. We obtain actual (unadjusted) earnings and forecast data from I/B/E/S and compare results to those generated using the a djusted I/B/E/S data. We replicate prior studies and find that conclusions are affected when using the actual I/B/E/S data.