Critics argue that shelf registration greatly reduces the ability of underwriters to perform adequate due diligence. This argument suggests underwriters will demand greater compensation for shelf issues compared to such traditional issues as an insurance premium for protection against potential litigation or loss of reputation caused by inadequate due diligence. Our findings suggest the presence of such a premium, that the premium is higher for firms with higher expected due diligence liabilities, and that underwriters perceive that shelf registration erodes due diligence and, subsequently, price the due diligence erosion accordingly. This pricing behavior is consistent with our findings that firms with higher expected due diligence liabilities are more likely to choose traditional registration.

We investigate the underlying causes and the announcement effects of plant closings. The closing in our sample do not appear related to takeover activity. Instead, they appear motivated by declining firm profitability. Firms announcing closings have lower earnings than market or industry medians; earnings typically improve slightly after the announcement. We find a negative stock-market reaction to plant-closing announcements.