Considerable research has documented the role of debt covenants and conservative financial accounting in addressing agency conflicts between lenders and borrowers. Beatty, A., Weber, J., and Yu, J. [2008. Conservatism and debt. Journal of Accounting and Economics, forthcoming] document interesting, but mixed, findings on the relation between debt covenants and conservative accounting, and the extent to which the two contracting mechanisms act as substitutes or complements. In this paper, I discuss the economic roles of financial reporting, debt covenants, and conservatism within the debt contracting environment, and attempt to fit BWY's findings within this context.

The appropriateness of financial reporting rules for derivative securities depends on corporations' reasons for using the instruments. Empirically, little is documented about how the instruments affect firms' risk exposures. This study examines derivatives' roles in firms initiating derivatives use. The results are consistent with firms using derivatives to hedge, and not to increase, entity risk. Firm risk (measured several ways) declines following derivatives use. Realized risk reductions and decisions to initiate derivatives programs vary across firms with the expected benefits from hedging. The findings emphasize the importance of hedge-accounting rules that incorporate the impact of derivatives and hedged items simultaneously.

To control risk-related incentive problems, equity holders are expected to manage both the convexity and slope of the relation between firm performance and managers’ wealth. I find stock options, but not common stockholdings, significantly increase the sensitivity of CEOs’ wealth to equity risk. Cross-sectionally, this sensitivity is positively related to firms’ investment opportunities. This result is consistent with managers receiving incentives to invest in risky projects when the potential loss from underinvestment in valuable risk-increasing projects is greatest. Firms’ stock-return volatility is positively related to the convexity provided to managers, suggesting convex incentive schemes influence investing and financing decisions.

Prior research has examined the firm-level performance implications of “busy” boards. Firm-level analysis, however, masks important heterogeneity in the time constraints and expertise of individual busy directors. We develop and validate shareholder voting as a proxy for shareholders’ satisfaction. Our director-specific tests provide compelling evidence that the potential costs of busy directors outweigh their benefits. At the same time, we uncover new sources of heterogeneity among busy directors. For example, the downsides are more pronounced for directors who sit on boards where fiscal year ends cluster in the same month. Our analysis highlights the role of shareholder voting in board composition research.

In a recent and influential empirical paper, Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (FLOS) [2005. The market pricing of accruals quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39, 295–327] conclude that accruals quality (AQ) is a priced risk factor. We explain that FLOS’ regressions examining a contemporaneous relation between excess returns and factor returns do not test the hypothesis that AQ is a priced risk factor. We conduct appropriate asset-pricing tests for determining whether a potential risk factor explains expected returns, and find no evidence that AQ is a priced risk factor.

Christensen et al. (2017) provide evidence that the dissemination of mine safety information in SEC filings has real effects on mine safety. We discuss the extent to which Christensen et al.’s results generalize to a research question that we consider of broader interest to accounting researchers, specifically where and when mandated disclosure in SEC filings can increase the dissemination of information. We also discuss identification of causal effects and generalizability concerns more broadly in the context of large sample studies and quasi-natural experiments, as well as potential ways authors might address these concerns in accounting research.

We examine three alternative explanations for excess endowments in not-for-profit firms: (1) growth opportunities, (2) monitoring, or (3) agency problems. Inconsistent with growth opportunities, we find that most excess endowments are persistent over time, and that firms with persistent excess endowments do not exhibit higher growth in program expenses or investments. Inconsistent with better monitoring, program expenditures toward the charitable good are lower for firms with excess endowments, and CEO pay and total officer and director pay are greater for firms with excess endowments. Overall, we find that excess endowments are associated with greater agency problems.

In this study we specify a simple earnings model, present managerial discretion hypotheses from existing literature, and assume efficient markets in order to evaluate five discretionary-accrual models. The five discretionary accrual models are the same as those evaluated in Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney [1995]. The models are Healy [1985]; DeAngelo [1986]; Jones [1991]; Jones as modified in Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney [1995]; and the industry model proposed by Dechow and Sloan [1991]. We specify three managerial discretion hypotheses. First, under the performance measure hypothesis, discretionary accruals help managers produce a reliable and more timely measure of firm performance (i.e., earnings) than using nondiscretionary accruals alone. Second, the opportunistic accrual management hypothesis is that discretionary accruals are employed to hide poor performance or postpone a portion of unusually good current earnings to future years. Finally, discretionary accruals are noise in earnings. This is the noise hypothesis. Our contribution is to make the joint hypotheses explicit and generate explicit predictions about the relative variability of earnings components,

[We compute and compare risk-adjusted CEO pay in the United States and United Kingdom, where the risk adjustment is based on estimated risk premiums stemming from the equity incentives borne by CEOs. Controlling for firm and industry characteristics, we find that U.S. CEOs have higher pay, but also bear much higher stock and option incentives than U.K. CEOs. Using reasonable estimates of risk premiums, we find that risk-adjusted U.S. CEO pay does not appear to be large compared to that of U.K. CEOs. We also examine differences in pay and equity incentives between a sample of non-U.K. European CEOs and a matched sample of U.S. CEOs, and find that risk-adjusting pay may explain about half of the apparent higher pay for U.S. CEOs.]

We empirically examine standard agency predictions about how performance measures are optimally weighted to provide CEO incentives. Consistent with prior empirical research, we document that the relative weight on price and non-price performance measures in CEO cash pay is a decreasing function of the relative variances. Agency theory speaks to the weights in total compensation (annual total pay and changes in the CEO's equity portfolio value), however, and we document that very little of CEOs' total incentives come from cash pay. We also document that variation in the relative weight on price and non-price performance measures in CEO total compensation is an increasing function of the relative variances. The conflicting results using total compensation indicate that existing findings on cash pay cannot be interpreted as evidence supporting standard agency predictions. Based on our results, we suggest approaches for future research on performance measure use in CEO total compensation.