The relationship between corruption and acquisition performance is examined in this study, with a focus on stakeholder support. The findings indicate that total acquisition-related gains are reduced when firms with lower corruption pressures acquire targets with higher corruption pressures. Moreover, a negative relationship is highlighted between the corruption differential and the level of support provided by stakeholders. In addition, merger and acquisition deals with higher corruption differences receive lower average support from suppliers, customers, and employees. The evidence suggests that stakeholder commitment is a possible channel through which corruption affects corporate performance. Implementing anticorruption efforts and operating as a multinational corporation are two important factors that may reduce the impact of corruption on acquisition performance.

By focusing on the price and trading volume movements around the ex-days of shareholder perks, we investigate whether and how investors value shareholder perks. Using comprehensive shareholder perks data from Japan, we demonstrate a significant price decline for stocks with shareholder perks around ex-days, as an evidence that shareholder perks are valuable for investors. We also show that heterogeneous preference for shareholder perks among investors leads to active trading around the ex-day. A price drop larger than the estimated cost of shareholder perks implies that gift giving is welfare increasing, providing a new insight into the long-standing debate on whether gift giving creates welfare gain or loss. This study also provides empirical findings that are consistent with behavioral model of mental accounting, which posits that receiving a gift-in-kind rather than cash or gift cards is utility increasing for consumers.