International equity funds attain superior subsequent performance by actively changing their country asset allocations, which we capture through a new measure of active country rotation intensity. Across funds, those that rotate country allocations with the greatest intensity on average have the highest value added. We offer evidence that a fund’s change of holdings in a country is associated with future outperformance in those specific holdings. Outperformance is concentrated on the downside when funds sell down country holdings before subsequent poor country market returns. Overall, our findings affirm that active international mutual funds have country market timing abilities.

International equity mutual funds increasingly hire managers from countries linked to their geographic mandate. We show these funds with “home-linked managers” exhibit a strong bias to invest in stocks of the managers' home countries and attract more flows. Portfolios of stocks from countries in which a fund has a home-field advantage outperform those managed by funds without home-linked managers. We are unable to identify specific sources of an information advantage associated with the home-linked manager's performance. But an analysis of fund flows reveals a role of investor trust in home-linked managers earned primarily through past superior performance.

Subsequent to the stricter corporate governance listing standards adopted by the NYSE and NASDAQ in the early part of this century and the independence requirements of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), the number of investment bankers (IB) serving on corporate boards has declined significantly. We document that the firms that lose the relationship with the investment bank after SOX become relatively more financially constrained soon after. The evidence is similar, albeit weaker, after departures of investment bankers at the advent of the financial crisis. We examine the mechanisms through which the constraints might be lowered, and observe that firms with IB directors face lower underwriting spreads when they issue equity and debt. Inconsistent with the hold-up problem associated with IB directors, the market reaction to seasoned equity offerings in firms with IB directors is less negative than comparable firms. The results point to costs associated with the increased attempts to improve board independence.