When a proxy contest is looming, the rate at which CEOs exercise options to sell (hold) the resulting shares slows down by 80% (accelerates by 60%), consistent with their desire to maintain or strengthen voting rights when facing challenges. Such deviations are closely aligned with features unique to proxy contests, such as the record dates and nomination status, and are more pronounced when the private benefits are higher or when the voting rights are more crucial. The distortions suggest that incumbents value their stocks higher than the market price when voting rights are valuable for defending control.

This article presents a model that incorporates habit formation and long-run risks into the Epstein–Zin preferences, and reveals intertemporal substitution as a distinctive channel, separate from risk aversion, in generating key asset market phenomena. With habit formation, both the risk aversion and intertemporal substitution channels enhance the market price of short-run consumption risk. With long-run risks, intertemporal substitution reduces the market prices of long-run consumption risks, working against risk aversion. The contrasting effects of the intertemporal substitution channel drive key differences in the model implications of habit formation and long-run risks.

This study examines the voting behavior of independent directors of public companies in China from 2004-2012. The unique data at the individual-director level overcome endogeneity in both board formation and proposal selection by allowing analysis based on within-board proposal variation. Career-conscious directors, measured by age and the director's reputation value, are more likely to dissent; dissension is eventually rewarded in the marketplace in the form of more outside directorships and a lower risk of regulatory sanctions. Director dissension improves corporate governance and market transparency primarily through the responses of stakeholders (shareholders, creditors, and regulators), to whom dissension disseminates information.

We analyze the contribution of leisure preferences to a model of long-run risks in leisure and consumption growth. The marginal utility of consumption is affected by short- and long-run risks in leisure under nonseparable and recursive preferences. We match equity risk premia and macroeconomic moments with plausible coefficients of relative-risk aversion. Additionally, the model generates a less negative to positively sloped average real yield curve, depending on the elasticity of substitution between the consumption of nondurables and services and leisure. Further, the incorporation of leisure in utility allows us to derive model implications for the return on human capital.

We model the employee incentive problem jointly with a firm’s exit decision. Our model predicts that firms in industries where human capital is important are more likely to go public and use high-powered, stock-based compensation. We also show that the higher the management quality, the more likely a firm is to go public than to be acquired. Regarding life cycle, a firm with high capital intensity and/or high management quality will choose to go public at a younger age.

By examining cross-country data for the period from 2000 to 2010, this study investigates whether monitoring by the media affects the performance of government-owned banks (GOBs). The results indicate that GOBs under strong monitoring do not underperform privately owned banks (POBs), whereas those under weak monitoring do underperform POBs. Further, we find that the strength of the media's monitoring has an important effect on corruption behavior and banks’ performance. This result provides an important policy implication that the government should minimize its ownership, and therefore its influence, in the media sector if it intends to improve the performance of its GOBs.

Theory suggests that unhealthy banks exhibit more pronounced flight-to-quality behavior during financial crises and, hence, the infusion of capital through unhealthy banks is less effective in relieving the liquidity shocks of vulnerable borrowers. We test these predictions by investigating how the financial health of leading US banks influenced their borrowers’ credit risk surrounding the announcement of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Changes in borrower credit risk, measured by credit default swap (CDS) spreads, should reflect the expected relief from liquidity shocks and other benefits of rescuing banks, such as maintaining the existing lending relationships. Consistent with the theory, prior to the TARP capital infusions, unhealthy banks’ borrowers with high leverage experienced a greater increase in their credit risk relative to similar healthy banks’ borrowers. Following the event, the CDS market anticipated less liquidity relief to these vulnerable unhealthy banks’ borrowers, but more liquidity relief to the vulnerable healthy banks’ borrowers.

We endogenize asset liquidity and financing constraints in a dynamic general equilibrium model with search frictions on capital markets. Assets traded on frictional capital markets are only partially saleable. Liquid assets, such as fiat money, instead, are not subject to search frictions and can be used to insure idiosyncratic investment risks. Partially saleable assets thus carry a liquidity premium over fully liquid assets. We show that, in equilibrium, low asset saleability is typically associated with lower asset prices, tighter financing constraints, thus stronger demand for public liquidity. Lower asset liquidity feeds into real allocations, constraining real investment, consumption, and production.

This paper provides new evidence on the roles and strategies adopted by different types of debtor-in-possession (DIP) lenders: “loan-to-loan” (LTL) lenders—prepetition secured bank lenders providing DIP financing, and “loan-to-own” (LTO) lenders—activist investors (i.e., hedge funds or private equity funds) providing DIP financing. We find that LTL is more likely in Chapter 11 firms with better operating performance, when prepetition bank lenders' stakes are at risk, or when they have prior lending relationships with the distressed borrower. In contrast, LTO is more likely in small firms or when prepetition bank lenders' loans are over-collateralized. Finally, we show that much of the governance improvement at the emergence is attributed to LTO lenders. We conclude that creditors of different institutional types adopt distinct strategies to enforce their control rights under Chapter 11 reorganization and to have contrasting effects on the governance outcomes of emerged firms.