Experts often collect and report information over time. What reporting protocol elicits the most information? Here, a principal receives reports sequentially from an agent with privately known ability, who observes two signals about the state of the world. The signals differ in initial quality and, unlike previous work, differ in quality improvement. The paper finds that “mind changes” (inconsistent reports) can signal talent if a smart agent improves faster. Also, sequential reports dominate when the principal's decision is very sensitive to information; a single report dominates if the mediocre agent's signals improve faster or the agent is likely mediocre.

In 2001, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) required market centers to publish monthly execution-quality reports in an effort to spur competition for order flow between markets. Using samples of stocks trading on several markets, we investigate whether past execution quality affects order-routing decisions and whether the new disclosure requirements influence this relationship. We find that routing decisions are associated with execution quality; markets reporting low execution costs and fast fills subsequently receive more orders. Moreover, the reports themselves appear to provide information that was unavailable previously. Our results are consistent with active competition for order flow that can be influenced by public disclosure.

[The article shows that two measures of the amount of private information in stock price-price nonsynchronicity and probability of informed trading (PIN)-have a strong positive effect on the sensitivity of corporate investment to stock price. Moreover, the effect is robust to the inclusion of controls for managerial information and for other information-related variables. The results suggest that firm managers learn from the private information in stock price about their own firms' fundamentals and incorporate this information in the corporate investment decisions. We relate our findings to an alternative explanation for the investment-to-price sensitivity, namely that it is generated by capital constraints, and show that both the learning channel and the alternative channel contribute to this sensitivity.]

[In 2001, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) required market centers to publish monthly execution-quality reports in an effort to spur competition for order flow between markets. Using samples of stocks trading on several markets, we investigate whether past execution quality affects order-routing decisions and whether the new disclosure requirements influence this relationship. We find that routing decisions are associated with execution quality; markets reporting low execution costs and fast fills subsequently receive more orders. Moreover, the reports themselves appear to provide information that was 2unavailable previously. Our results are consistent with active competition for order flow that can be influenced by public disclosure.]

[This article develops and empirically implements an arbitrage-free, dynamic term structure model with "priced" factor and regime-shift risks. The risk factors are assumed to follow a discrete-time Gaussian process, and regime shifts are governed by a discrete-time Markov process with state-dependent transition probabilities. This model gives closed-form solutions for zero-coupon bond prices, an analytic representation of the likelihood function for bond yields, and a natural decomposition of expected excess returns to components corresponding to regime-shift and factor risks. Using monthly data on U.S. Treasury zero-coupon bond yields, we show a critical role of priced, state-dependent regime-shift risks in capturing the time variations in expected excess returns, and document notable differences in the behaviors of the factor risk component of the expected returns across high and low volatility regimes. Additionally, the state dependence of the regime-switching probabilities is shown to capture an interesting asymmetry in the cyclical behavior of interest rates. The shapes of the term structure of volatility of bond yield changes are also very different across regimes, with the well-known hump being largely a low-volatility regime phenomenon.]

[We investigate the effects of shareholder governance mechanisms on bondholders and document two new findings. First, the impact of shareholder control (proxied by large institutional blockholders) on credit risk depends on takeover vulnerability. Shareholder control is associated with higher (lower) yields if the firm is exposed to (protected from) takeovers. In the presence of shareholder control, the difference in bond yields due to differences in takeover vulnerability can be as high as 66 basis points. Second, event risk covenants reduce the credit risk associated with strong shareholder governance. Therefore, without bond covenants, shareholder governance, and bondholder interests diverge.]

We investigate the effects of shareholder governance mechanisms on bondholders and document two new findings. First, the impact of shareholder control (proxied by large institutional blockholders) on credit risk depends on takeover vulnerability. Shareholder control is associated with higher (lower) yields if the firm is exposed to (protected from) takeovers. In the presence of shareholder control, the difference in bond yields due to differences in takeover vulnerability can be as high as 66 basis points. Second, event risk covenants reduce the credit risk associated with strong shareholder governance. Therefore, without bond covenants, shareholder governance, and bondholder interests diverge.

This article develops and empirically implements an arbitrage-free, dynamic term structure model with “priced” factor and regime-shift risks. The risk factors are assumed to follow a discrete-time Gaussian process, and regime shifts are governed by a discrete-time Markov process with state-dependent transition probabilities. This model gives closed-form solutions for zero-coupon bond prices, an analytic representation of the likelihood function for bond yields, and a natural decomposition of expected excess returns to components corresponding to regime-shift and factor risks. Using monthly data on U.S. Treasury zero-coupon bond yields, we show a critical role of priced, state-dependent regime-shift risks in capturing the time variations in expected excess returns, and document notable differences in the behaviors of the factor risk component of the expected returns across high and low volatility regimes. Additionally, the state dependence of the regime-switching probabilities is shown to capture an interesting asymmetry in the cyclical behavior of interest rates. The shapes of the term structure of volatility of bond yield changes are also very different across regimes, with the well-known hump being largely a low-volatility regime phenomenon.

The article shows that two measures of the amount of private information in stock price—price nonsynchronicity and probability of informed trading (PIN)—have a strong positive effect on the sensitivity of corporate investment to stock price. Moreover, the effect is robust to the inclusion of controls for managerial information and for other information-related variables. The results suggest that firm managers learn from the private information in stock price about their own firms’ fundamentals and incorporate this information in the corporate investment decisions. We relate our findings to an alternative explanation for the investment-to-price sensitivity, namely that it is generated by capital constraints, and show that both the learning channel and the alternative channel contribute to this sensitivity.