The COVID-19 pandemic caused a global health and economic crisis to which governments responded with massive policy interventions. Using Brazil as a testing ground, we investigate the influence of the pandemic and ensuing policy interventions on local credit markets. First, we find that the pandemic has a significantly negative impact on local credit. Second, using a novel manually collected database on the staggered municipal government policy interventions, we show heterogenous effects of interventions: positive effects of soft interventions (e.g., social distancing and mass gathering restrictions) and late reopening, and negative effects of hard interventions (e.g., closure of non-essential services) and early reopening. Third, we find that state-owned banks grant more local credit than privately owned banks during the COVID-19 crisis but this difference is less pronounced than it was in the 2008 Financial Crisis. We confirm our results using pre-pandemic local political preference as instrument for policy interventions and orthogonalized policy intervention indicators, and in placebo tests.

We analyze how the inflow of TARP funds in the wake of the 2007/2008 financial crisis impacted banks’ interbank market activity. We show that TARP banks’ interbank market activity was impacted in a statistically and economically significant way. Their interbank lending via federal funds sold increased by 77 percent relative to the mean of the control group of non-TARP banks. We further show that among the TARP banks, the most affected ones also increased credit risk taking, while at the same time not increasing profitability. These findings suggest a new, heretofore not investigated channel through which TARP may have increased banks’ moral hazard incentives.