Unlike other investments in the U.S., research and development budgets are not depreciated but expensed. Thus, pre-tax reported earnings fluctuate dollar-for-dollar with changes in R&D budgets. Because executives know more about the firm than outsiders, they may adjust R&D budgets in order to manage accounting earnings and stock prices. Discretionary changes in R&D may also reflect managerial incentives, taxes, and free cash flow. We study a panel of 100 U.S. companies with large R&D budgets for the decade between 1977 and 1986. On average, R&D budget adjustments reduce the anticipated gap between analysts' earnings forecasts and reported income. In the cross-section of firms, more gap closure is associated with high trading volume and high business risk. Less earnings management occurs if the CEO and institutional investors own an important fraction of the shares.

The expectations theory of the term structure is well known to give wrong signals as to the future course of long-term interest rates. One explanation involves rational time-varying term premia. However, the “anomaly” may also be due to inflation forecast errors. We study survey forecasts of inflation. It seems that the respondents' forecasts are insufficiently adaptive. Interest rates reflect expectations similar to the inflation forecasts. As a result, past survey forecast errors reliably predict premia on U.S. Government Bonds.

Research in experimental psychology suggests that, in violation of Bayes' rule, most people tend to “overreact” to unexpected and dramatic news events. This study of market efficiency investigates whether such behavior affects stock prices. The empirical evidence, based on CRSP monthly return data, is consistent with the overreaction hypothesis. Substantial weak form market inefficiencies are discovered. The results also shed new light on the January returns earned by prior “winners” and “losers.” Portfolios of losers experience exceptionally large January returns as late as five years after portfolio formation.

Research in experimental psychology suggests that, in violation of Bayes' rule, most people tend to “overreact” to unexpected and dramatic news events. This study of market efficiency investigates whether such behavior affects stock prices. The empirical evidence, based on CRSP monthly return data, is consistent with the overreaction hypothesis. Substantial weak form market inefficiencies are discovered. The results also shed new light on the January returns earned by prior “winners” and “losers.” Portfolios of losers experience exceptionally large January returns as late as five years after portfolio formation.

In a previous paper, we found systematic price reversals for stocks that experience extreme long‐term gains or losses: Past losers significantly outperform past winners. We interpreted this finding as consistent with the behavioral hypothesis of investor overreaction. In this follow‐up paper, additional evidence is reported that supports the overreaction hypothesis and that is inconsistent with two alternative hypotheses based on firm size and differences in risk, as measured by CAPM‐betas. The seasonal pattern of returns is also examined. Excess returns in January are related to both short‐term and long‐term past performance, as well as to the previous year market return.

In a previous paper, we found systematic price reversals for stocks that experience extreme long-term gains or losses: Past losers significantly outperform past winners. We interpreted this finding as consistent with the behavioral hypothesis of investor overreaction. In this follow-up paper, additional evidence is reported that supports the overreaction hypothesis and that is inconsistent with two alternative hypotheses based on firm size and differences in risk, as measured by CAPM-betas. The seasonal pattern of returns is also examined. Excess returns in January are related to both short-term and long-term past performance, as well as to the previous year market return.