The question of whether the design of the corporate executive pay package reflects an attempt to reduce agency costs between shareholders and managers is addressed. The components of senior executive pay are found to vary systematically across firms in a manner that cannot easily be explained by tax effects, and which would indicate that individual elements of pay are aimed at controlling for limited horizon and risk exposure problems. Managerial decisions and the structure of managerial pay therefore appear to be interrelated.

The presence of long-term debt in a corporation's capital structure is shown to give rise to a valuable tax-timing option that can be exercised by the firm on behalf of its shareholders. This option, which is not available if the firm is fully equity financed, implies that leverage will have a positive tax effect on total firm value even if there is no such effect associated with the tax deductibility of the coupon interest payments on debt. The more volatile interest rates and bond prices are, the more valuable the tax-timing option and the larger the favorable impact of debt on shareholder wealth.

ABSTRACT The presence of long‐term debt in a corporation's capital structure is shown to give rise to a valuable tax‐timing option that can be exercised by the firm on behalf of its shareholders. This option, which is not available if the firm is fully equity financed, implies that leverage will have a positive tax effect on total firm value even if there is no such effect associated with the tax deductibility of the coupon interest payments on debt. The more volatile interest rates and bond prices are, the more valuable the tax‐timing option and the larger the favorable impact of debt on shareholder wealth.