We develop a valuation model for venture capital–backed companies and apply it to 135 US unicorns, that is, private companies with reported valuations above $1 billion. We value unicorns using financial terms from legal filings and find that reported unicorn post-money valuations average 48% above fair value, with 14 being more than 100% above. Reported valuations assume that all shares are as valuable as the most recently issued preferred shares. We calculate values for each share class, which yields lower valuations because most unicorns gave recent investors major protections such as initial public offering (IPO) return guarantees (15%), vetoes over down-IPOs (24%), or seniority to all other investors (30%). Common shares lack all such protections and are 56% overvalued. After adjusting for these valuation-inflating terms, almost one-half (65 out of 135) of unicorns lose their unicorn status.

We develop a model of the joint capital structure decisions of banks and their borrowers. Bank leverage of 85% or higher emerges because bank seniority both dramatically reduces bank asset volatility and incentivizes risk-taking by producing a skewed return distribution. Nonfinancial firms choose low leverage to protect their banks, presenting a partial resolution to the low-leverage puzzle. Our setup naturally extends to include government actions as we model bank assets using a modified Basel framework. Deposit insurance and bailout expectations lead banks and borrowers to take on more risk. Capital regulation lowers bank leverage but can increase bank risk due to a compensating increase in borrower leverage. Despite this, doubling current capital requirements reduces bank default risk by up to 90%, with only a small increase in loan interest rates.

We study how information disclosure concerns shape the choice of limited partners (LPs) by venture capitalists (VCs). Late-2002 court rulings prevented public LPs from providing confidentiality to investment managers. The best-performing VCs, but not other managers, responded by excluding public LPs from their new funds. Lost access reduced public LP returns by 1.6 billion relative to 14 billion of their VC commitments. Legislation reducing disclosure, contracts limiting information access, and added fund-of-funds intermediaries helped restore access. These changes focused on protecting portfolio company information, highlighting the importance of proprietary information for VC investing and the potential costs of transparency.

We survey over 1,000 venture capitalists (VCs) on how the COVID-19 pandemic has affected their decisions and investments. Despite the historical importance of in-person meetings, VCs do not report difficulty finding quality entrepreneurs or major changes in time allocation. They do report difficulty in evaluating deals, more investor-friendly terms, and a decreased investment rate, with about one-sixth of VCs reporting pressure from limited partners to conserve capital. Although aggregate returns are largely unchanged, there is high dispersion both within and across funds. A follow-up survey shows faster-than-expected recovery in deal volume, terms, and returns.

We survey 885 institutional venture capitalists (VCs) at 681 firms to learn how they make decisions. Using the framework in Kaplan and Strömberg (2001), we provide detailed information on VCs’ practices in pre-investment screening (sourcing evaluating and selecting investments), in structuring investments, and in post-investment monitoring and advising. In selecting investments, VCs see the management team as somewhat more important than business-related characteristics such as product or technology although there is meaningful cross-sectional variation across company stage and industry. VCs also attribute the ultimate investment success or failure more to the team than to the business. While deal sourcing, deal selection, and post-investment value-added all contribute to value creation, the VCs rate deal selection as the most important of the three. We compare our results to those for chief financial officers (Graham and Harvey, 2001) and private equity investors (Gompers et al., 2016a).

Open banking (OB) empowers bank customers to share their financial transaction data with fintechs and other banks. New cross-country data shows 49 countries adopted OB policies, privacy preferences predict policy adoption, and adoption spurs fintech entry. UK microdata shows that OB enables: (i) consumers to access both financial advice and credit; (ii) SMEs to establish new lending relationships. In a calibrated model, OB universally improves welfare through entry and product improvements when used for advice. When used for credit, OB promotes entry and competition by reducing adverse selection, but higher prices for costlier or privacy-conscious consumers partially offset these benefits.