ABSTRACT This paper explores the economic role credit rating agencies play in the corporate bond market. We consider three existing theories about multiple ratings: information production, rating shopping, and regulatory certification. Using differences in rating composition, default prediction, and credit spread changes, our evidence only supports regulatory certification. Marginal, additional credit ratings are more likely to occur because of, and seem to matter primarily for, regulatory purposes. They do not seem to provide significant additional information related to credit quality.

This paper studies operational risk in the hedge fund industry using due diligence reports. Many funds suffer from operational problems, including limited disclosure of legal and regulatory issues. We use direct evidence of inadequate or failed internal processes to derive a canonical correlation-based measure for operational risk consistent with the Basel definition. It controls for selection bias using an extension of Heckman's (1979) procedure. Operational risk increases the likelihood of subsequent poor performance and fund disappearance, but does not influence investors’ return-chasing behavior. Our study emphasizes the importance of information verification in the context of financial intermediation.