The inner mechanism of global competition remains much as Adam Smith defined it two centuries ago: nations interact, while seeking to win by gaining higher wealth. Self-interest in gaining wealth drives the process, although wars and other deviations often occur. In this setting, economic concepts of competition, benefit-cost criteria and risk can help in defining efficient choices among policy tools (including military activities). From research using those concepts (my study with Theodora Shepherd, 1986), 1 will discuss several tentative conclusions about the U.S.-USSR rivalry. 1) The global competitive process (let us call it Process 1) has properties which appear to make it stable. 2) The United States and USSR appear to possess inherent security from conquest by each other. 3) Each country's efficient limit on military spending can be analyzed as an analog of payments for insurance, to raise national security. In that context, inherent security reduces the U.S. and USSR's efficient levels of armaments. 4) Military entropy occurs; global wealth is subject to a general process (Process 2) which subtracts it into military forms and warfare.