[We provide experimental evidence that relaxing margin restrictions to allow more short selling can exacerbate overpricing, even though it reduces equilibrium price levels. This is because smart-money traders initially profit more by front-running optimistic investor sentiment than by disciplining prices. When short selling is not possible, competitive pressures among arbitrageurs rapidly drive prices to the equilibrium. However, the risk of margin calls slows the convergence process, because arbitrageurs who sell short too early face substantial losses if they are unable to synchronize their trades with other arbitrageurs (as in Abreu and Brunnermeier. 2002.]

ABSTRACT: Using an experiment, I examine whether involvement in scorecard implementation can mitigate the effects of motivated reasoning that occur when the scorecard is framed as a causal chain rather than merely as a balanced set of measures. Psychological research on motivated reasoning suggests that managers will evaluate and interpret data in ways consistent with preferences, increasing their tendency to arrive at conclusions that are consistent with their desired conclusions (Kunda 1990). Consistent with that research, results of my study show that managers who are involved in selecting strategic initiatives perceive those initiatives as having been more successful than managers who are not involved in the initiative-selection process (holding constant actual scorecard performance). Results suggest further that simply framing the scorecard as a causal chain is not sufficient to mitigate these effects. However, framing the scorecard as a causal chain, in conjunction with involving managers in the selection of scorecard measures, mitigates the effects of motivated reasoning tied to manager involvement in initiative selection.

We study the macroprudential roles of bank capital regulation and monetary policy in a borrowing cost channel model with endogenous financial frictions, driven by credit risk, bank losses and bank capital costs. These frictions induce financial accelerator mechanisms and motivate the examination of a macroprudential toolkit. Following credit shocks, countercyclical regulation is more effective than monetary policy in promoting price, financial and macroeconomic stability. For supply shocks, combining macroprudential regulation with a stronger anti-inflationary policy stance is optimal. The findings emphasize the importance of the Basel III accords in alleviating the output-inflation trade-off faced by central banks, and cast doubt on the desirability of conventional (and unconventional) Taylor rules during periods of financial distress.

We report the results of three experiments based on the model of Hong and Stein (1999). Consistent with the model, the results show that when informed traders do not observe prices, uninformed traders generate long-term price reversals by engaging in momentum trade. However, when informed traders also observe prices, uninformed traders generate reversals by engaging in contrarian trading. The results suggest that a dominated information set is sufficient to account for the contrarian behavior observed among individual investors, and that uninformed traders may be responsible for long-term price reversals but play little role in driving short-term momentum.

Research in behavioral economics suggests that, in addition to their traditional incentive effects, formal control systems can influence psychological motivations. We extend this literature by demonstrating experimentally that formal controls directly influence people's sense of what behaviors are appropriate in the setting (personal norms), and indirectly alter people's tendency to conform to the behavior of those around them (descriptive norms). These effects persist even after the controls are changed, so that the effects of current controls can be strongly influenced by past control strength. Our results support those who are incorporating psychological factors into principal-agent models (such as Fischer and Huddart [2008]), and suggest that those models should be further modified to incorporate correlations between personal norms and conformity to descriptive norms.

Prior research provides evidence that information affects financial statement users' judgments less when that information is provided in a less accessible format (e.g., information disclosed in a footnote or less prominent financial statement rather than being recognized on the income statement [Maines and McDaniel 2000]). We provide evidence that, conditional on users performing the analysis necessary to transform the financial statements to appear as if disclosed information had been recognized, that information may affect users' judgments more than it would have if it had been recognized initially. Our experiments are set in the context of constructive capitalization of operating leases. The first experiment manipulates three variables that we hypothesize will contribute to this effect: choice to use transformed financial statements, effort spent on the transformation process, and reconciliation of pre- and post-transformation numbers. We provide evidence that, in the constructive-capitalization setting we operationalize, information has a greater effect on judgments when effort was expended to obtain the information and the information is displayed in a reconciled format. The second experiment focuses on the effort effect and replicates it with additional controls. These results have implications for standard-setters who consider the relative benefits of recognition and disclosure, and for financial statement users who transform financial statements as part of their analyses.

ABSTRACT Strategic performance measurement systems operationalize firm strategy with a set of performance measures. A consequence of such alignment is the tendency for managers to lose sight of the strategic construct(s) the measures are intended to represent, and subsequently act as though the measures are the constructs of interest, a phenomenon referred to as surrogation . We investigate how involvement in strategy selection affects managers’ propensity to exhibit surrogation. We predict and find that strategy selection reduces surrogation. Surprisingly, we do not find that engaging in strategy deliberation, a key process underlying strategy selection, reduces surrogation. Thus, managers’ involvement in the actual choice of strategy appears to be both a necessary and sufficient condition to mitigate surrogation. Our paper broadens understanding of factors that influence surrogation, such as the effects of different aspects of managers’ strategic involvement and buy‐in. Further, by documenting how managers behave within (as opposed to simply with ) strategic performance measurement systems, we highlight the potential for managers to endogenously influence the effectiveness of such systems.

We provide experimental evidence that relaxing margin restrictions to allow more short selling can exacerbate overpricing, even though it reduces equilibrium price levels. This is because smart-money traders initially profit more by front-running optimistic investor sentiment than by disciplining prices. When short selling is not possible, competitive pressures among arbitrageurs rapidly drive prices to the equilibrium. However, the risk of margin calls slows the convergence process, because arbitrageurs who sell short too early face substantial losses if they are unable to synchronize their trades with other arbitrageurs (as in Abreu and Brunnermeier. 2002. Journal of Financial Economics 66(2--3):341--60; 2003. Econometrica 71(1):173--204). The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

ABSTRACT We report the results of three experiments based on the model of Hong and Stein (1999) . Consistent with the model, the results show that when informed traders do not observe prices, uninformed traders generate long‐term price reversals by engaging in momentum trade. However, when informed traders also observe prices, uninformed traders generate reversals by engaging in contrarian trading. The results suggest that a dominated information set is sufficient to account for the contrarian behavior observed among individual investors, and that uninformed traders may be responsible for long‐term price reversals but play little role in driving short‐term momentum.