Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia enacted legislation reducing interstate banking restrictions between July 1982 and April 1993. For these 50 banking bills, deregulation increased the average price of bank stocks. Returns vary cross-sectionally by firm characteristics, regulatory features, and economic conditions. Returns are positively related to the characteristics of acquisition targets. Furthermore, returns are positively related to legislative features that increase the bargaining power of potential targets and economic conditions that are likely to encourage bank acquisition. These findings are consistent with the relaxation of geographic restrictions increasing activity in the corporate control market.

The authors examine the returns of stocks in the Cowles Industrial Index before and after the introduction of personal income taxes in 1917. This is distinct from earlier studies because they cross-sectionally analyze the relationship between the returns of the individual stocks and measures of tax-loss selling potential and size. The authors find that excess returns at the turn-of-the-year and for the month of January were not significant until after 1917. These results provide strong support for the tax-loss selling hypothesis as an explanation for the January seasonal in the returns of small firms.

Elizabeth S. Cooperman, Winson B. Lee, James. P. Lesage, Geographical Integration and the Retail CD-Pricing Decisions of Large Depository Institutions, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 73, No. 3 (Aug., 1991), pp. 546-552

This paper investigates the deterioration of the banking industry's risk-control system during the 1980s and the time-varying relation between a bank's ex-ante risk-taking incentives and its ex-post risk-taking behavior over the period 1977–1994. We document that banks with high charter value imposed self-discipline on risk-taking behavior at all times. In contrast, banks with low charter value assumed significantly more risk beginning around 1983, and this behavior continued into the early 1990s. These findings have several important policy implications.

This paper uses both an ARIMA transfer-function intervention model and a panel data analysis to examine the effect of the Ohio deposit insurance crisis in 1985 on the pricing of six-month retail certificates of deposit (CDs) for federally-insured Ohio banks and savings and loans. Adjusting for pricing reactions due to changes in market rates, we find a significant, unanticipated rise in CD-rate premiums on the initial event week of the crisis that continued for approximately seven weeks. Consistent with a contingent insurance guarantee hypothesis, rate premiums are found to be risk based.

This paper uses both an ARIMA transfer‐function intervention model and a panel data analysis to examine the effect of the Ohio deposit insurance crisis in 1985 on the pricing of six‐month retail certificates of deposit (CDs) for federally‐insured Ohio banks and savings and loans. Adjusting for pricing reactions due to changes in market rates, we find a significant, unanticipated rise in CD‐rate premiums on the initial event week of the crisis that continued for approximately seven weeks. Consistent with a contingent insurance guarantee hypothesis, rate premiums are found to be risk based.

This paper uses both an ARIMA transfer-function intervention model and a panel data analysis to examine the effect of the Ohio deposit insurance crisis in 1985 on the pricing of six-month retail certificates of deposit (CDs) for federally-insured Ohio banks and savings and loans. Adjusting for pricing reactions due to changes in market rates, the authors find a significant, unanticipated rise in CD-rate premiums on the initial event week of the crisis that continued for approximately seven weeks. Consistent with a contingent insurance guarantee hypothesis, rate premiums are found to be risk based.

We examine the returns of stocks in Cowles Industrial Index before and after the introduction of personal income taxes in 1917. This is distinct from earlier studies because we cross‐sectionally analyze the relationship between the returns of the individual stocks and measures of tax‐loss selling potential and size. We find that excess returns at the turn‐of‐the‐year and for the month of January were not significant until after 1917. These results provide strong support for the tax‐loss selling hypothesis as an explanation for the January seasonal in the returns of small firms.