We analyze the capital market assessment of bank risk factors in Europe and the United States for the 1990–2011 period. The focus is on bank stock returns in a multi-factor framework that includes interest rate risk and market risk as well as credit risk, real estate risk, sovereign risk, and foreign exchange risk. Our findings indicate that bank risk exposures are multi-dimensional and time-varying but well reflected in bank stock returns. Dynamic beta exposures and time-varying variance shares accompany structural changes in the banking industry and the recent financial crisis. During the last two decades, interest rate risk has changed but credit risk still represents a major factor for explaining bank stock returns. For the recent financial crisis we provide evidence of a change in the capital market's assessment of bank risk exposures with a significant revaluation of real estate and sovereign risks. Overall, our factor model offers a parsimonious approach for modeling the risk dynamics in the banking industry and provides evidence for the capital market's ability to assess bank risk exposures.

In an environment of asymmetric information, banks face information externalities due to their role as intermediaries of information. In particular, bank insiders will possess private information from monitoring loan customers. Accordingly, outsiders may interpret changes in a bank's financial policy as signals about the quality of its loan portfolio and to the extent that the assets (loans) of different banks are viewed as similar, they will interpret such signals as pertaining to non-announcing banks as well leading to contagion effects. We test for the presence of contagion effects in stock returns associated with announcements of dividend cuts by money-center banks. We find that dividend cuts induce negative abnormal returns in the stocks of non-announcing money-center banks and to a lesser extent in the stocks of large regional banks. The observed contagion effects appear consistent with informed rather than contagious panic behavior because these effects are systematically related to risks that are common to all affected banks.

We postulate that the announcement effect of dividend reductions should be more severe for banks than for nondashfinancial firms because bank customers may avoid financially weak institutions and discontinue the relationship when negative information is released. To test our hypothesis we investigate a total of 81 dividend reductions by 56 commercial banks listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ for the period 1974–1991. We find significant abnormal returns of −8.02% for the two-day event window and − 11.46% for a two-week period. These negative valuation effects are stronger than those reported in studies for dividend reductions of nondashfinancial firms and for other negative bank announcements. We also explore the relationship between abnormal returns and specific bank characteristics cross-sectionally and find a stronger reaction for larger banks.

An essential motive for investing in commodities is to enhance the performance of portfolios traditionally including only stocks and bonds. We analyze the in-sample and out-of-sample portfolio effects resulting from adding commodities to a stock-bond portfolio for commonly implemented asset allocation strategies such as equally- and strategically-weighted portfolios, risk-parity, minimum-variance as well as reward-to-risk timing, mean-variance and Black–Litterman. We analyze different commodity groups such as agricultural and livestock commodities that currently are critically discussed. The out-of-sample portfolio analysis indicates that the attainable benefits of commodities are much smaller than suggested by previous in-sample studies. Hence, in-sample analyses, such as spanning tests, might exaggerate the advantages of commodities. Moreover, the portfolio gains greatly vary between different types of commodities and sub-periods. While aggregate commodity indices, industrial and precious metals as well as energy improve the performance of a stock-bond portfolio for most asset allocation strategies, we hardly find positive portfolio effects for agriculture and livestock. Consequently, investments in food commodities are not essential for efficient asset allocation.

We analyze the zero-leverage phenomenon around the world. Countries with a common law system, high creditor protection, and a dividend imputation or dividend relief tax system exhibit the highest percentage of zero-leverage firms. The increasing prevalence of zero-leverage firms in all sample countries is related to market-wide forces during our sample period, such as IPO waves, shifts in industry composition, increasing asset volatility, and decreasing corporate tax rates. Firm-level comparisons reveal that only a small number of firms deliberately maintain zero-leverage. Most zero-leverage firms are constrained by their debt capacity. Analyzing the time-series dynamics of leverage and investment behavior, we further show that firms which pursue a zero-leverage policy only for a short period of time seek financial flexibility.

Most empirical studies suggest that mutual funds do not persistently outperform an appropriate benchmark in the long run. We analyze this lack of persistence in terms of two equilibrating mechanisms: fund flows and manager changes. Using data on actively managed US equity mutual funds, we find that if neither mechanism is operating, winner funds (top-decile ranked in previous year) continue to significantly outperform loser funds (bottom-decile ranked in previous year) by 4.08 percentage points per annum. However, the difference between previous winner and loser funds declines to zero within one year if the two mechanisms are acting together. Thus, equity mutual fund out- and underperformance are unlikely to persist in well-functioning financial markets.