We study the relative efficiency of centralized versus decentralized organizational forms given optimized managerial performance evaluation within an incomplete contracting framework with risk‐averse agents under moral hazard. Decentralization and performance evaluation are complementary control choices and the efficiency of an organizational form depends on the design of performance evaluation. Divisions can make relationship‐specific investments that not only improve firm performance, but also increase compensation risk. We find that pure divisional performance evaluation is optimal under centralization, whereas under decentralization, optimal compensation contracts include a combination of divisional and firm‐wide performance evaluation. When comparing both organizational forms, we find that the optimal form depends on managers’ degree of risk‐aversion and the uncertainty of the business environment. Contrary to previous literature, we find that centralization dominates in many situations, particularly at high degrees of risk‐aversion and high uncertainty.

We investigate whether firms that proclaim a commitment to corporate social responsibility (CSR) by CSR reporting indeed internalize such a commitment and behave more responsibly. We analyze the association of the issuance and quality of voluntary CSR reports with the occurrence, number, and severity of corporate misbehaviors, both preceding and subsequent to CSR reporting. We find a significantly positive association of CSR reporting with our measures of prior and future misbehavior. The results are corroborated by a quasi-natural experiment around the Rana Plaza disaster where we find that the signatories of an accord for better working conditions have significantly higher prior and future misbehavior relative to non-signatories and firms unaffected by the exogenous shock. Our results are in line with legitimacy theory implying that, on average, the firms’ proclaiming commitment to CSR is not a signal of internalized commitment but more likely serves greenwashing and impression management purposes.

We examine how bonus deferral and bonus recovery affect performance in an effort-sensitive task, where improving overall performance requires effort towards output quantity and output quality. Deferred bonuses and bonus recovery are important elements in contemporary incentive schemes designed to motivate employees to act in the best interest of the firm. We propose that bonus deferral improves performance by encouraging employees to adopt an abstract mindset that focuses on behavior for the good of the firm (“to do the right thing”) and thus to exert more effort. In contrast, bonus recovery serves an effort-directing role by indicating undesirable behavior that should be avoided. Bonus recovery activates a mindset that focuses on the monetary implications of their behavior and thus supersedes the abstract mindset of bonus deferral and its positive effects. Our experimental results show that bonus deferral leads to higher performance quantity; in contrast, bonus recovery increases performance quality, the performance domain related to bonus recovery, but at the expense of performance quantity. Furthermore, we find that bonus recovery counteracts the positive effects of bonus deferral and leads to a reduction in overall performance. Two supplemental experiments provide direct process evidence supporting the proposed theoretical mechanism. Our study contributes to the debate on effective compensation by showing that combining bonus deferral and bonus recovery may have undesirable consequences on effort provision and allocation.