We investigate whether hedge funds (HFs) undertake activism in the corporate bond market. Although there is a growing empirical literature investigating HF activism in the equity market, we know little about the role of HF activists in the corporate bond market. The empirical setting is the active enforcement of bondholders' rights during 2003–2007, triggered by issuers' violation of a standard bond covenant requiring timely financial reporting. Using HF holding data of convertible bonds in Form 13F filings, we identify HF interventions. The patterns of HF ownership suggest that HFs actively purchased convertible bonds to increase their ownership before the issuance of default notices. Relative to other interventions, HF interventions are more likely to target companies with higher levels of cash holdings but less likely to target companies with a greater amount of private debt outstanding. Furthermore, we find that HF interventions are associated with elevated bond trading frequency before late filing notifications and issuances of default notices, as well as a wealth transfer from stockholders and non‐intervening bondholders to intervening bondholders. Taken together, the empirical evidence demonstrates that HFs take actions to force the issuance of default notices in response to delay in financial reporting, suggesting that the primary objective of HF activism in this setting is to extract short‐term profit from bond issuers.

We derive the default cascade model and the fire-sale spillover model in a unified interdependent framework. The interactions among banks include not only direct cross-holding, but also indirect dependency by holding mutual assets outside the banking system. Using data extracted from the European Banking Authority, we present the interdependency network composed of 48 banks and 21 asset classes. For the robustness, we employ three methods, called Anan, Hała and Maxe, to reconstruct the asset/liability cross-holding network. Then we combine the external portfolio holdings of each bank to compute the interdependency matrix. The interdependency network is much denser than the direct cross-holding network, showing the complex latent interaction among banks. Finally, we perform macroprudential stress tests for the European banking system, using the adverse scenario in EBA stress test as the initial shock. For different reconstructed networks, we illustrate the hierarchical cascades and show that the failure hierarchies are roughly the same except for a few banks, reflecting the overlapping portfolio holding accounts for the majority of defaults. We also calculate systemic vulnerability and individual vulnerability, which provide important information for supervision and relevant management actions.