We study the credit market impact and real effects of one of the largest borrower bailouts in history, enacted by the government of India against the backdrop of the 2007–2008 financial crisis. We find that the bailout led to a significant reallocation of credit and greater defaults, but had no offsetting positive effect on productivity, wages, or consumption. Post-program loan performance deteriorates faster in districts with greater program exposure, an effect that is not driven by greater risk-taking of banks. Loan defaults become more sensitive to the electoral cycle after debt relief, suggesting strategic default in response to the bailout.

Weather is a key source of income risk, especially in emerging market economies. This paper uses a randomized controlled trial involving Indian farmers to study how an innovative rainfall insurance product affects production decisions. We find that insurance provision induces farmers to invest more in higher-return but rainfall-sensitive cash crops, particularly among educated farmers. This shift in behavior occurs ex ante, when realized monsoon rainfall is still uncertain. Our results suggest that financial innovation can mitigate the real effects of uninsured production risk.

We study the credit market impact and real effects of one of the largest borrower bailouts in history, enacted by the government of India against the backdrop of the 2007–2008 financial crisis. We find that the bailout led to a significant reallocation of credit and greater defaults, but had no offsetting positive effect on productivity, wages, or consumption. Post-program loan performance deteriorates faster in districts with greater program exposure, an effect that is not driven by greater risk-taking of banks. Loan defaults become more sensitive to the electoral cycle after debt relief, suggesting strategic default in response to the bailout. Received December 1, 2015; editorial decision April 11, 2017 by Editor Philip Strahan.

We assess the role of monetary incentives in a mission-oriented organization by randomly assigning workers to one of two bonus schemes, incentivizing either the performance of a microcredit program (bottom line) or the empowerment of clients (mission). We find that the credit bonus improved credit-related outcomes but undermined the social mission, while the social bonus did not harm the bottom line. These results are consistent with a multitasking model with production spillovers or with prosocial behavior. We show that when mission-related rewards are not feasible, organizations that care about both the mission and the bottom line prefer flat wages to incentives.

We implemented a randomized field experiment in Malawi examining borrower responses to being fingerprinted when applying for loans. This intervention improved the lender's ability to implement dynamic repayment incentives, allowing it to withhold future loans from past defaulters while rewarding good borrowers with better loan terms. As predicted by a simple model, fingerprinting led to substantially higher repayment rates for borrowers with the highest ex ante default risk, but had no effect for the rest of the borrowers. We provide unique evidence that this improvement in repayment rates is accompanied by behaviors consistent with less adverse selection and lower moral hazard.

Weather is a key source of income risk for many firms and households, particularly in emerging market economies. This paper studies how an innovative risk management instrument for hedging rainfall risk affects production decisions among a sample of Indian agricultural firms, using a randomized controlled trial approach. We find that the provision of insurance induces farmers to shift production towards higher-return but higher-risk cash crops, particularly amongst more-educated farmers. Our results support the view that financial innovation may help mitigate the real effects of uninsured production risk. In a second experiment we elicit willingness to pay for insurance policies that differ in their contract terms, using the Becker-DeGroot-Marshak mechanism. Willingness-to-pay is increasing in the actuarial value of the insurance, but substantially less than one-for-one, suggesting that farmers’ valuations are inconsistent with a fully rational benchmark.