We model an investment bank's choice of resource allocation by the probability of acquirers' mergers and acquisitions frequency in the future to theoretically link the role of investment banks to the acquirer returns. Our model predicts the heterogeneity in the quality of advisory services provided by the same investment bank that leads to the heterogeneity in acquirer returns. Such heterogeneity declines as the likelihood of an industry merger wave rises. Controlling for investment bank fixed effects, acquirer fixed effects and potential self-selection bias, we find empirical evidence supporting our hypotheses.

Our research suggests that firms condition their CSR policies on the availability of economic resources. Using the value of a firm's real estate as a measure of exogenous shocks on the firm's economic resources, we show that increases in resources reduce CSR concerns, while decreases in resources increase CSR concerns. The relative impact of resource availability on CSR concerns, however, depends on several organizational variables that influence a firm's preferences for CSR investments. Furthermore, we show that firm reactions to increases and decreases in resources are not symmetric: resource gains reduce CSR concerns, but resource losses increase CSR concerns even more markedly. Overall, these results suggest that firms may treat CSR decisions in much the same way as other investment decisions.

We examine the relevance and effectiveness of stock return correlations among financial institutions as an indicator of systemic risk. By analyzing the trends and fluctuations of daily stock return correlations and default correlations among the 22 largest bank holding companies and investment banks from 1988 to 2008, we find that daily stock return correlation is a simple, robust, forward-looking, and timely systemic risk indicator. There is an increasing trend in stock return correlation among banks, whereas there is no obvious correlation trend among non-banks. We also disaggregate the stock returns into systematic and idiosyncratic components and find that the correlation increases are largely driven by the increases in correlations between banks’ idiosyncratic risks, which give rise to increasing systemic risk. Correlation spikes tend to predict or coincide with significant economic or market events, especially during the 2007–2008 financial crisis. Furthermore, we show that stock return correlations offer a perspective on the level of systemic risk in the financial sector that is not already captured by default correlations. Stock return correlations are not subject to data limitations or model specification errors that other potential systemic risk measures may face. Therefore, we recommend that regulators and businesses monitor daily stock return correlations among those large and highly leveraged financial institutions to track the level of systemic risk.

The recent U.S. financial crisis and governmental bailout of financial institutions have intensified the debate on the need for effectively measuring and monitoring the financial institutions’ risks. This paper contributes to this discussion by introducing a market-based capital measurement that better captures the dynamics of bank risk and returns. Evidence confirms that these market-based capital adequacy metrics are much more sensitive to risk factors and more responsive to economic events than the traditional accounting/regulatory report based capital models, which often underestimate the true capital needs. The CDS premia, another market-bases solvency measure, seems to overreact to declines in capital adequacy.

In the presence of high uncertainty and limited experience, can observing the actions of other acquiring predecessors help firms make better acquisition decisions? Using a sample of cross-border M&As conducted by US acquirers in developing countries, we document a positive and significant relationship between an acquirer's performance and its predecessors' acquisition activity. This relationship is especially pronounced in the prevalence of news events about the outcome of predecessors' acquisitions, when predecessors consist of US peers from the same industry and/or when targets are based in culturally distant countries. Our findings shed light on one channel through which information spillovers across industries and acquiring firms could be a key driver of value creation in developing market cross-border M&As.

In contrast to the previously documented cross-border discount, we find that there is positive cross-border effect for US acquirers during late 1990s and early 2000s. This is especially particular the case for those that acquire/merge with targets from segmented financial markets where acquirers experience significantly higher positive abnormal returns than those that acquire targets from integrated financial markets. Furthermore, firms acquiring segmented-market targets are also characterized by significantly higher post-merger operating performance improvement. The results indicate that the observed positive cross-border effect is mainly due to the increase in the number of transactions involving targets from segmented markets, in which the average firm experience significant financial constraints. We contend that value is created by a combination of firms with different financial market integration status, in which funds are provided to high cost firms. The finding that the value creation is even higher within the group of acquirers with a lower cost of capital provides additional support for our conjecture.

While the signaling hypothesis has played a prominent role as the economic rationale associated with the initial public offering (IPO) underpricing puzzle (Welch (1989)), the empirical evidence on it has been mixed at best (Jegadeesh, Weinstein, and Welch (1993), Michaely and Shaw (1994)). This paper revisits the issue from the vantage point of close to two decades of additional experience by examining a sample of foreign IPOs—firms from both financially integrated and segmented markets—in U.S. markets. The evidence indicates that signaling does matter in determining IPO underpricing, especially for firms domiciled in countries with segmented markets, which as a result face higher information asymmetry and lack access to external capital markets. We find a significant positive and robust relationship between the degree of IPO underpricing and segmented-market firms’ seasoned equity offering (SEO) activities. For firms from integrated markets, in contrast, the analyst-coverage purchase hypothesis appears to matter more in explaining IPO underpricing, and the aftermarket price appreciation explains these firms’ SEO activities. The evidence, therefore, clearly supports the notion that some firms are willing to leave money on the table voluntarily to get a more favorable price at seasoned offerings when they are substantially wealth constrained, a prediction embedded in the signaling hypothesis.

We show that firms led by politically partisan CEOs are associated with a higher level of corporate tax sheltering than firms led by nonpartisan CEOs. Specifically, Republican CEOs are associated with more corporate tax sheltering even when their wealth is not tied with that of shareholders and when corporate governance is weak, suggesting that their tax sheltering decisions could be driven by idiosyncratic factors such as their political ideology. We also show that Democratic CEOs are associated with more corporate tax sheltering only when their stock-based incentives are high, suggesting that their tax sheltering decisions are more likely to be driven by economic incentives. In sum, our results support the political connection hypothesis in general but highlight that the specific factors driving partisan CEOs' tax sheltering behaviors differ. Our results imply that it may cost firms more to motivate Democratic CEOs to engage in more tax sheltering activities because such decisions go against their political beliefs regarding tax policies.

That firms actively influence public policy to advance private interests is taken for granted in most economies. In China, the activism of public actors in shaping private interests suggests that the public rather than private sector is more influential to the political economy. In this paper, we test the extent to which this is true in among Chinese provinces. We conduct a cluster quasi-experiment using the 2012 anti-corruption campaign. We find that the declining involvement of public actors in economic decisions during the campaign did not result into lower productivity in provinces with higher private sector participation, especially in unregulated industries and those not dominated by state-owned enterprises. De facto political power from 30-years of private wealth accumulation may have helped establish market-driven norms of economic behavior, strengthening the political economy against the vicissitudes of public actors.