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A Comparison of Centralized and Fragmented Markets with Costly Search

Journal of Finance 2005 60(3), 1567-1590
How does quotation transparency affect financial market performance? Biais's irrelevance proposition in 1993 shows that centralized markets yield the same expected bid–ask spreads as fragmented markets, other things equal. However, de Frutos and Manzano demonstrated in 2002 that expected spreads in fragmented markets are smaller and market participants prefer to trade in fragmented markets. This paper introduces liquidity traders' costs of searching for a better quote into the Biais model and derives opposite conclusions to these previous studies: expected spreads in centralized markets are smaller and liquidity traders prefer centralized markets, while market makers prefer fragmented markets.

Attendance of board meetings and company performance: Evidence from Taiwan

Journal of Banking & Finance 2013 37(11), 4157-4171 open access
This paper empirically investigates board meeting attendance and its effects on the performance of Taiwanese listed corporations. Directors with higher qualifications attend board meetings more often by themselves. The ownership of the largest shareholder of a company also has a positive effect on director’s own meeting attendance. High meeting attendance by directors themselves can enhance a firm’s performance but high attendance by their representatives has an adverse effect. Independence of directors or a board is also positively associated with firm performance. These results largely hold even when the sample is decomposed to count for different ownership structures and director types.

Overconfident Institutions and Their Self-Attribution Bias: Evidence from Earnings Announcements

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2021 56(5), 1738-1770 open access
Institutional demand for a stock before its earnings announcement is negatively related to subsequent returns. The relation is not attributable to the price pressure of institutional demand and is stronger for stocks with higher information asymmetry and/or greater valuation difficulty. These findings support the notion that overconfident institutions misprice stocks. Following announcements, institutions’ behavior exhibits the outcome-dependent feature of self-attribution bias. Whether they become more overconfident and delay their mispricing correction depends on whether earnings news confirms their preannouncement trades. This behavioral bias also offers a new explanation for the well-known post-earnings-announcement drift.