This article documents fund usages of insider share pledge loans based on transactions data and subsequent corporate activities in Chinese firms. We find that the market has expanded 111 times since 2003, reaching 2.9 trillion RMB by 2017. The expansion is driven by share pledges for financing firms, including focal listed firms and other firms. Among transactions for financing focal listed firms (17.4 percent), 87 percent of the funds flow into the firms. Each 1 percent increase in controlling shareholders’ ownership is associated with a 7.8–11.7 percent increase in the likelihood of pledging shares to finance the focal listed firms and an additional 2.1–5.7 percent for financially constrained firms. The stock market reacts to transactions for financing focal listed firms with abnormal returns around 0.26–0.65 percent and an additional 0.29–4.37 percent for financially constrained firms. These patterns do not exist for share pledges for other purposes or by noncontrolling shareholders.

Taking advantage of corruption scandals in China, we construct a natural experiment and identify the ousting of corrupt politicians, and firms connected with them through bribery and personal relationships (event firms). We find that the investment expenditure of event firms declines significantly after the ousting of the politicians compared with that of non-event firms, especially for non-SOEs. We also find that, after the ousting of the politicians, investment efficiency improves for event SOEs, but declines for event non-SOEs, compared with their non-event counterparts. We also document that the ousting of the politicians influences firm investment decisions more after the recent anti-corruption campaign, for bribing firms and for firms in more corrupt regions. These results are robust to alternative measurements of key variables and specifications.

Using a sample of 612 listed Chinese non-SOEs from 2006 to 2009, we show that the use of collateral is higher in family-controlled firms. This effect is more pronounced when family firms have a larger control-ownership wedge, family representation in management, and are led by a descendant chairman/CEO. We further document that having multiple large shareholders, paying higher dividends, having completed the split-share structure reform and being located in provinces with more competitive credit markets can mitigate the incentive of controlling families to engage in expropriation and reduce the level of collateral required. Overall, we contend that in China, the risk of expropriation associated with family control leads to an increased credit risk and, in turn, higher collateral being required by banks.

This study investigates the effect of banks’ dual holding on bank lending and firms’ investment decisions using a sample of listed firms in China. We find that dual holding leads to easier access to bank loans, a result that is more pronounced for non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) than SOEs. We also find that dual holding distorts banks’ lending decisions and harms the investment efficiency for SOEs, while resulting in optimal lending decisions and enhanced investment efficiency for non-SOEs. For non-SOEs, further analysis suggests that optimal lending decisions and efficient investment can be achieved for firms with higher ownership concentration, and firms in which the family and foreign investors are the controlling shareholders. We argue that, in emerging markets, whether a bank plays a monitoring role by directly holding the debt and equity claims of companies relies heavily on whether the potential collusion between firm executives and bank managers can be averted, which in turn is determined by the firms’ governance framework and ownership structure.

This paper examines the impact of ownership structure on executive compensation in China's listed firms. We find that the cash flow rights of ultimate controlling shareholders have a positive effect on the pay–performance relationship, while a divergence between control rights and cash flow rights has a significantly negative effect on the pay–performance relationship. We divide our sample based on ultimate controlling shareholders' type into state owned enterprises (SOE), state assets management bureaus (SAMB), and privately controlled firms. We find that in SOE controlled firms cash flow rights have a significant impact on accounting based pay–performance relationship. In privately controlled firms, cash flow rights affect the market based pay–performance relationship. In SAMB controlled firms, CEO pay bears no relationship with either accounting or market based performance. The evidence suggests that CEO pay is inefficient in firms where the state is the controlling shareholder because it is insensitive to market based performance but consistent with the efforts of controlling shareholders to maximize their private benefit.

The 2013 depoliticization regulation (Rule 18) in China mandates government officials to resign from board positions in public firms, terminating firms' political connections established through these directors. Exploiting this regulation as a quasi-experiment, we document that politically connected firms increase their cash holdings 12.7% more than non-connected firms because of these resignations. This pattern is more pronounced among firms that rely more heavily on the government for external resources. Among state-owned firms, the pattern is more evident in firms that are more deeply privatized. In addition, firms that lose political ties experience a significant decline in obtaining bank loans and government subsidies, and they are also slower to adjust their cash holdings toward the optimal level. These findings underscore the role of corporate political linkages in facilitating firms' access to resources that “soften” firms' budget constraints.

Previous theoretical and empirical studies suggest that CEOs' political connections are valuable to firms. We examine whether such connections become entrenched if the expected political capital fails to materialize and the firm lacks other types of political power. Using a sample of listed non-SOEs in China, we show that politically connected CEOs have a lower probability of turnover and cause a weaker turnover-performance sensitivity than non-politically connected CEOs. Further analyses show that these turnover patterns are not consistent with alternative explanations, such as superior managerial ability, being a member of controlling families or being promoted from the inside. The turnover patterns are less pronounced in firms with alternative political power, such as connected boards or being vital to the local economy. Following the turnover of politically connected CEOs, firm performance does not necessarily undergo significant improvement. Our results call for new theories that comprehend the real effects of political connections.

Using a panel of Chinese firms over the period 2003–2013, we show that, from the supply-side perspective, as a result of the implementation of the economic stimulus package in China, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) received more bank loans and invested more than non-SOEs. We further find that after the implementation of the economic stimulus package, bank lending became less responsive to firm profitability, and firm investments became less responsive to investment opportunities for SOEs, non-SOEs from favoured industries and regions, and non-SOEs with political connections. Overall, our findings support the view that the stimulus package and the associated increase in bank loan supply in China resulted in more resources being allocated to SOEs.