Previous studies have identified a negative relation between firms’hiring rates and future stock returns in the cross-section. We document that this relation is significantly steeper in industries that rely relatively more on high-skill workers than low-skill workers. A longshort portfolio sorted on firm-level hiring rate earns an average annual return of 8.6 % in high-skill industries, and only 0.9 % in low-skill industries. Moreover, this pattern is not explained by the standard CAPM. These findings are consistent with a neoclassical model with labor force heterogeneity and labor market frictions if it is more costly to replace high-skill than low-skill workers.

[This article proposes a novel method of extracting the cost of default from the change in the market value of a firm's assets upon default. Using a large sample of firms with observed prices of debt and equity that defaulted over fourteen years, we estimate the cost of default for an average defaulting firm to be 21.7% of the market value of assets. The costs vary from 14.7% for bond renegotiations to 30.5% for bankruptcies, and are substantially higher for investment-grade firms (28.8%) than for highly levered bond issuers (20.2%), which extant estimates are based on exclusively.]

We show that labor market frictions are first-order for understanding credit markets. Wage growth and labor share forecast aggregate credit spreads and debt growth as well as or better than alternative predictors. They also predict credit risk and debt growth in a cross section of international firms. Finally, high labor share firms choose lower financial leverage. A model with labor market frictions and risky long-term debt can explain these findings, and produce large credit spreads despite realistically low default probabilities. This is because precommitted payments to labor make other committed payments (i.e., interest) riskier.

This paper investigates whether risks associated with time-varying arrival of jumps and their effect on the dynamics of higher moments of returns are priced in the conditional mean of daily market excess returns. We find that jumps and jump dynamics are significantly related to the market equity premium. The results from our time-series approach reinforce the importance of the skewness premium found in cross-sectional studies using lower-frequency data; and offer a potential resolution to sometimes conflicting results on the intertemporal risk-return relationship. We use a general utility specification, consistent with our pricing kernel, to evaluate the relative value of alternative risk premium models in an out-of-sample portfolio performance application.

This article proposes a novel method of extracting the cost of default from the change in the market value of a firm's assets upon default. Using a large sample of firms with observed prices of debt and equity that defaulted over fourteen years, we estimate the cost of default for an average defaulting firm to be 21.7% of the market value of assets. The costs vary from 14.7% for bond renegotiations to 30.5% for bankruptcies, and are substantially higher for investment-grade firms (28.8%) than for highly levered bond issuers (20.2%), which extant estimates are based on exclusively.

Material news events can be potentially important sources of jumps in stock returns. We collect 21 million news articles associated with more than 9000 publicly-traded companies and use textual analyses to derive measures to summarize the news. We find that stock return jumps (including time-variation in jump-size distributions and jump intensity) are significantly related to news flow frequency and content and those effects increase substantially over the last few decades. The sensitivity of jump probability to news is stronger for firms with higher media visibility, analyst coverage, and institutional ownership. This sensitivity also varies across different news categories.

Utilizing a unique and novel setting of disclosure mandate threshold under Regulation AB (Reg AB), we investigate the relationship between disclosure and trust in asset securitization. Post-Reg AB enactment, we observe a significant bunching of originators just below the disclosure threshold. Less trustworthy originators are more likely to adjust their portfolio sizes to remain below this threshold, particularly when loan originators and deal sponsors are unaffiliated, which are cases in which disclosure plays a greater role in reducing information asymmetry. Additionally, these originators are more likely to misrepresent loan quality. Our findings reveal a strong relationship between disclosure and trust—trustworthy originators disclose more and originate higher-quality loans, while less trustworthy originators disclose less and produce lower-quality loans.

We present a rationale for bidder termination provisions that considers their effect on bidders’ and targets’ joint takeover gains. The provision’s inclusion can create value by enabling termination when the target becomes less valuable to the bidder than on its own, but creates a trade-off because termination may also occur when the target is more valuable to the bidder than on its own. This trade-off explains why the provision is included in only some deals, and explains variation in termination fees. Inclusion of the provision is associated with larger combined announcement returns, provided that the termination fee is priced appropriately.

Previous studies have identified a negative relation between firms’ hiring rates and future stock returns in the cross-section. We document that this relation is significantly steeper in industries that rely relatively more on high-skill workers than low-skill workers. A long-short portfolio sorted on firm-level hiring rate earns an average annual return of 8.6% in high-skill industries, and only 0.9% in low-skill industries. Moreover, this pattern is not explained by the standard CAPM. These findings are consistent with a neoclassical model with labor force heterogeneity and labor market frictions if it is more costly to replace high-skill than low-skill workers. Received August 14, 2015; editorial decision December 31, 2016 by Editor Leonid Kogan.

Examining the contractual disclosures during the sale of private‐label residential mortgage‐backed securities before the 2008 financial crisis, we find that textual contents in the risk‐factor section predict subsequent losses and yet were not reflected in pricing. Insurance companies, especially life insurers and insurers with low regulatory capital ratios, are more exposed to textual risks. Consistent with issuers hedging litigation risks with disclosure, we find that textual contents are associated with second‐lien underreporting and preissuance written communications. Overall, we find that investors neglected risks in the purportedly safe assets before the crisis.