This study examines whether the term of the auditor–client relationship (i.e., auditor tenure) is associated with future stock price crash risk measured both ex ante and ex post. Using a large sample of U.S. public firms with Big 4 auditors, we find robust evidence that auditor tenure is negatively related to one†year†ahead stock price crash risk. The evidence is consistent with monitoring†by†learning where development of client†specific knowledge over the term of the auditor–client relationship enhances auditors’ ability to detect and deter bad news hoarding activities by clients, thereby reducing future crash risk. This result holds even after controlling for endogeneity of the tenure/crash risk relation. We further provide evidence indicating that option market investors do not fully incorporate the information contained in the term of auditor–client relationship in predicting future stock price crash risk. Our empirical results have important policy implications for regulators concerned with ensuring auditor independence.Les auteurs se demandent si la durée de la relation auditeur†client (soit la durée du mandat de l'auditeur) est en relation avec le risque d'effondrement futur du cours des actions, évalué ex ante et ex post. En étudiant un vaste échantillon de sociétés des États†Unis faisant appel public à l’épargne qui ont recours aux services des Quatre Grands cabinets d'audit, ils recueillent des preuves convaincantes que la durée du mandat de l'auditeur est en relation négative avec le risque d'effondrement du cours des actions une année à l'avance. Ces preuves sont conformes à la pratique de la « surveillance par l'apprentissage », le perfectionnement des connaissances relatives au client pendant la durée de la relation auditeur†client améliorant l'aptitude des auditeurs à déceler et prévenir chez les clients le comportement de thésaurisation des mauvaises nouvelles, ce qui a pour effet de réduire le risque d'effondrement futur. Ces résultats persistent même une fois contrôlée l'endogénéité de la relation entre la durée du mandat et le risque d'effondrement. Les auteurs produisent d'autres preuves que les investisseurs sur le marché des options n'incorporent pas entièrement l'information que recèle la durée de la relation auditeur†client dans la prévision du risque d'effondrement futur du cours des actions. Les résultats empiriques de l’étude ont d'importantes conséquences au chapitre des politiques pour les autorités de réglementation soucieuses de l'indépendance des auditeurs.

This study examines whether religiosity at the county level is associated with future stock price crash risk. We find robust evidence that firms headquartered in counties with higher levels of religiosity exhibit lower levels of future stock price crash risk. This finding is consistent with the view that religion, as a set of social norms, helps to curb bad-news-hoarding activities by managers. Our evidence further shows that the negative relation between religiosity and future crash risk is stronger for riskier firms and for firms with weaker governance mechanisms measured by shareholder takeover rights and dedicated institutional ownership.

Using a large sample of U.S. public firms, we find robust evidence that short interest is positively related to one-year ahead stock price crash risk. The evidence is consistent with the view that short sellers are able to detect bad news hoarding by managers. Additional findings show that the positive relation between short interest and future crash risk is more salient for firms with weak governance mechanisms, excessive risk-taking behavior, and high information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. Empirical support is provided showing that the relation between short interest and crash risk is driven by bad news hoarding.

This study tests two opposing views of institutional investors—monitoring versus short-termism. We present evidence that institutional investor stability is negatively associated with 1-year-ahead stock price crash risk, consistent with the monitoring theory of institutional investors but not the short-termism theory. Our findings are shown to be robust to alternative empirical specifications, estimation methods and endogeneity concerns. In addition, we find that institutional ownership by public pension funds (bank trusts, investment companies, and independent investment advisors) is significantly negatively (positively) associated with future crash risk, consistent with findings that pension funds more actively monitor management than other types of institutions.

Prior research documents that information transmitted via director networks affects firms' policies and real economic activities. Given a manager's potential monopoly over firm information, it is important to analyze whether information transmission through director social networks undermines the manager's control. Specifically, we explore whether information flow through director networks influences managers' ability to hoard bad news. We predict and find that the extent of external connections of the board of directors is negatively associated with future stock price crash risk. Additional analysis implies that this evidence is driven by firms with more powerful executives, with weaker auditor monitoring, or subject to strong investor protection, and by directors with greater monitoring incentives or responsibilities and directors with less firm‐specific knowledge. Collectively, our research lends empirical support for the monitoring view under which better‐informed directors narrow the scope for bad news hoarding evident in stock price crash risk. In another series of tests, we fail to find evidence consistent with the information leakage view under which directors pass sensitive firm‐specific information to connections that trade on the information before its public release. Other analysis helps dispel the concern that the endogenous match between directors and companies is spuriously responsible for our core results. Our empirical findings have important implications on how social networks affect the proper functioning of capital markets.

We utilize the staggered adoption of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) by U.S. state courts as an exogenous shock to the proprietary costs of disclosure and study the impact of the IDD on corporate financial reporting policy. We find compelling evidence that firms headquartered in states that adopt the IDD exhibit a significant increase in financial reporting opacity relative to firms headquartered in states that fail to adopt the IDD. Our finding is robust to a battery of sensitivity tests. Cross-sectional evidence shows that the impact of the IDD on opacity is more pronounced for firms with weak external monitoring. Further, our path analysis shows that financial reporting opacity engendered by the adoption of the IDD had broad negative consequences for capital market investors.

We analyze whether tough IRS monitoring generates a positive externality by constraining managers' bad news hoarding activities. Supporting this prediction, we find a negative relation between the threat of an IRS audit and stock price crash risk. Our evidence is consistent with recent theory that outside investors learn more about firms when tax enforcement is stricter. Additionally, path analysis suggests that the monitoring channel (direct path) plays a critical role in shaping crash risk relative to information asymmetry channels of tax planning and accruals manipulation (indirect paths). Consistent with other predictions, we find that the monitoring role of IRS audits intensifies when firms experience worse agency conflicts stemming from CEO power and incentives. Collectively, our research implies that external monitoring by tax authorities protects shareholders against managers suppressing negative firm-specific information that engenders stock price crash risk, particularly when CEOs have wider scope and stronger incentives to hoard bad news.