We model the feedback loop between the sales of trading advantages (e.g., data or co-location services) and traders’ endogenous participation in financial markets. Whereas a trader’s benefit from purchasing trading advantages increases with aggregate market participation, the benefit from participating decreases with other traders’ purchases of trading advantages that impose negative externalities on counterparties. In equilibrium, sellers of trading advantages (e.g., data providers or securities exchanges) may maximize their profits by prompting inefficiently low market participation and liquidity. We study the consequences of altering the market structure and show that the resulting policy prescriptions contrast sharply with standard models.

We study the interaction between noisy demand and skewed asset payoffs. In our model, price as a function of quantities is convex in a neighborhood around zero if and only if skewness is positive. The combination of convexity and noise produces the idiosyncratic skewness effect, a documented negative relationship between an asset’s idiosyncratic skewness and its expected return. We further offer an explanation for the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle. Finally, our theory predicts that higher idiosyncratic skewness strengthens the idiosyncratic volatility effect (and vice versa). We find support for this prediction in the cross-section of stock returns.

Intermediation chains represent a common pattern of trade in over-the-counter markets. We study a classic problem impeding trade in these markets: an agent uses his market power to inefficiently screen a privately informed counterparty. We show that, generically, if efficient trade is implementable via any incentive-compatible mechanism, it is also implementable via a trading network that takes the form of a sufficiently long intermediation chain. We characterize information sets of intermediaries that ensure this striking result. Sparse trading networks featuring long intermediation chains might thus constitute an efficient market response to frictions, in which case no regulatory action is warranted.

We study contracts between naive present‐biased consumers and risk‐neutral firms. We show that the welfare loss from present bias vanishes as the contracting horizon grows. This is true both when bargaining power is on the consumers' and on the firms' side, when consumers cannot commit to long‐term contracts, and when firms do not know the consumers' naiveté. However, the welfare loss from present bias does not vanish when firms do not know the consumers' present bias or when they cannot offer exclusive contracts.