Excess control rights by inside shareholders have been documented to hurt minority shareholders. This paper shows that such governance feature may benefit creditors. Using a sample of U.S. dual-class firms, I show that these firms take less operational and financial risk than similar single-class firms, consistent with insiders’ emphasis on long-term survival to access ongoing private control benefits. Such risk avoidance translates into lower borrowing costs for dual-class firms. Further, lenders are able to use specific covenants to prevent potential expropriations by insiders. The overall relationship between excess control rights and firm value may be less negative than previously thought.

It is well-documented that government bonds with almost identical cash flows can trade at different prices. This article analyzes the cross-section of bond spreads across developed European countries and documents a novel result. While a measure of the convenience yield of government bonds helps explain these spreads, it cannot explain the behavior of bond spreads in periods of widening credit risk. The article documents bond spreads between new and old issues tighten for low-quality sovereigns. In other words, the newer more liquid bonds become cheaper, not more expensive, relative to their older counterparts. We offer an explanation based on price pressure and provide empirical support using data on net flows of investors in sovereign bonds.

Duffee (2005) shows that the amount of consumption risk (i.e., the conditional covariance between market returns and consumption growth) is procyclical. In light of this “Duffee Puzzle,” I empirically demonstrate that the conditional covariance between dividend growth (i.e., the immediate cash flow part of market returns) and consumption growth is (1) procyclical and (2) a consistent source of procyclicality in the puzzle. Moreover, I solve an external habit formation model that incorporates realistic joint dynamics of dividend growth and consumption growth. The procyclical dividend-consumption comovement entails two new procyclical terms in the amount of consumption risk via cash flow and valuation channels, respectively. These two procyclical terms play an important role in generating a realistic magnitude of consumption risk. In contrast to extant habit formation models, the conditional equity premium no longer increases monotonically when a negative consumption shock arrives because it might lower the amount of risk while increasing the price of risk.

We examine the impact of lifetime work experience of top executives on mergers and acquisitions (M&As) behavior and outcome. Based on hand-collected data of top executives in a sample of Chinese firms during 2002–2018, we construct a generalist ability index of top executives to study the impact of generalist top executives (GTEs) vs. specialist top executives (STEs) on M&As. Our findings suggest that GTEs conduct more M&As than those of STEs. The results are robust to alternate specifications of M&A frequencies and after accounting for endogeneity issue. Furthermore, the M&A announcement and long-term returns are better for acquirers with GTEs than those with STEs. We attribute the findings to GTEs' ability of searching target ex ante, making the M&A process efficient, and fully leveraging their social networks post M&A. In addition, we find the increase in M&A activities in GTE firms are primarily due to GTEs' experience of M&As rather than their talents. Finally, the M&As from GTEs improve investment efficiency and are less likely to divest targets post M&As. In sum, GTEs conduct more M&As and they create value in the process.

Understanding the role of bank lending in corporate innovation is important to policymakers, practitioners, and academics. We provide new evidence on such a role by exploiting the implementation of SFAS 166/167, which removed the off‐balance sheet status of certain securitized assets of banks. The regulation affects bank lending and thus represents a credit supply shock to borrowing firms. We find that affected banks raise spreads and cut loan amounts after the regulation. Firms that borrow from affected banks reduce R&D investment and the number and quality of the patents they generate. The reduction is concentrated among firms whose banks experience more downward pressure on capital ratios and greater market discipline, and firms that are more dependent on external financing. Additional analyses reveal that information asymmetry between incumbent banks and outsiders with respect to borrowing firms prevent them from switching. The overall findings suggest that bank lending promotes borrowing firms' innovation activities. Policies that restrict bank lending are likely to hurt innovation of borrowers.

The increased equity lending supply (ELS) in the equity loan market, available for short sellers to borrow, exposes a firm to greater short selling threats. Considering short sellers' strong incentives to uncover firm-specific information and monitor managers, we hypothesize that short selling threats, proxied by ELS, enhance corporate investment efficiency. We find that ELS significantly reduces managerial tendencies to underinvest (overinvest) especially for firms prone to underinvest (overinvest). The effect of ELS on investment efficiency is stronger for firms with higher information asymmetry and weaker corporate governance, confirming short sellers' role in mitigating information and agency costs. However, short selling risk weakens the effect of ELS. Our evidence is robust to endogeneity checks and suggests that corporate investment can be driven by a particular capital market condition: the amount of lendable shares in the equity loan market.

Using experimental data, we document that the impact of professional norms on the risk-taking of bank employees depends on their expectations of peers’ risk preferences. When the professional identity of bank employees is made salient, those who expect colleagues to take more risk than themselves increase risky investments by 5.2% points in a mock investment task, while others do not statistically change their risk-taking behaviors. Data from placebo experiments with non-bank employees do not exhibit such empirical patterns. The results are consistent with peer effects and social identity theories, and challenge the existing evidence that professional norms in the banking industry decrease risk-taking.

This paper proposes “implied stochastic volatility models” designed to fit option-implied volatility data and implements a new estimation method for such models. The method is based on explicitly linking observed shape characteristics of the implied volatility surface to the coefficient functions that define the stochastic volatility model. The method can be applied to estimate a fully flexible nonparametric model, or to estimate by the generalized method of moments any arbitrary parametric stochastic volatility model, affine or not. Empirical evidence based on S&P 500 index options data show that the method is stable and performs well out of sample.

In this paper we quantitatively investigate how central bank communication affects the market yield curve on announcement days. We do this for two central banks who communicate future policy intentions by means of publishing the path of expected future policy rates. We find that unanticipated changes in the published policy rates correspond to yield changes in the same direction. However, policy revisions cannot explain all variation in market rates on announcement days. We further shed some light on which sources of disagreement could explain these differences.

This article provides insights into the inner workings of internal corporate M&A teams using survey evidence from sixty-five firms from Austria, Germany, and Switzerland. We find that internal teams create value, especially relative to external advisors, by directing transaction rationales, screening targets, and employing performance metrics to assess post-merger success. Teams emphasizing economic rationales as a merger motive are associated with higher returns than those teams more apt to consider behavioral motives. We consider several team characteristics and find that financial experience is the most persistent and significant attribute in explaining the outcomes across various deal stages. Another key result from our survey-based evidence is that latent M&A team factors explain ∼54% of the acquirer fixed effects in announcement return regressions.