We link newly digitized personnel records of the U.S. government for 1907–1921 to census data to study the segregation of the civil service by race under President Woodrow Wilson. Using a difference-in-differences design around Wilson’s inauguration, we find that the introduction of employment segregation increased the black-white earnings gap by 3.4–6.9 percentage points. This increasing gap is driven by a reallocation of existing black civil servants to lower-paid positions, lowering their returns to education. Importantly, the negative effects extend beyond Wilson’s presidency. Using census data for 1900–1940, we show that segregation caused a relative decline in the home ownership rate of black civil servants. Moreover, by comparing children of black and white civil servants in adulthood, we provide suggestive evidence that descendants of black civil servants who were exposed to Wilson’s presidency exhibit lower levels of education, earnings, and social mobility. Our combined results thus document significant short- and long-run costs borne by minorities during a unique episode of state-sanctioned discrimination.

This paper explores how a prominent place-based policy in China, the national high-tech zones, affects local innovation output and entrepreneurial activities. Making use of staggered establishments of national high-tech zones in various Chinese cities, we find that the establishment of national high-tech zones has positive effects on local innovation output and entrepreneurial activities. A number of additional tests suggest that the effects appear causal. Access to finance, reductions in administrative burdens, and talent cultivation are three plausible underlying economic channels. Our paper sheds new light on the evaluation of the effectiveness of China’s place-based policies.

I show that a disruption to the financial sector can reshape the patterns of global trade for decades. I study the first modern global banking crisis originating in London in 1866 and collect archival loan records that link multinational banks headquartered there to their lending abroad. Countries exposed to bank failures in London immediately exported significantly less and did not recover their lost growth relative to unexposed places. Their market shares within each destination also remained significantly lower for four decades. Decomposing the persistent market-share losses shows that they primarily stem from lack of extensive-margin growth, as the financing shock caused importers to source more from new trade partnerships. Exporters producing more substitutable goods, those with little access to alternative forms of credit, and those trading with more distant partners experienced more persistent losses, consistent with the existence of sunk costs and the importance of finance for intermediating trade.

We analytically study the economic consequences of the disclosure of managerial compensation contracts in a setting where two firms, by designing compensation contracts for their respective managers, compete for a new investment opportunity. Each manager is privately informed about her firm's profitability from this investment. We find that the disclosure leads to firms' emphasizing short-term stock performance in their managers' contracts. This, in turn, induces managers to signal favorable private information via myopic overinvestment, which deters rival firms' investments and gains their own firms a competitive edge. Nonetheless, such strategic use of compensation contracts is absent when the contracts are not disclosed; under this regime, equilibrium contracts only focus on long-term outcomes. Moreover, while disclosure-mandate-induced managerial myopia erodes firm profits, it may benefit consumer and social welfare. Our theory illuminates the economic consequences of the Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) disclosure implemented in 2006.

Building on evidence that lifetime experiences shape individuals’ macroeconomic expectations, we study asset prices in an economy in which a representative agent learns with fading memory about unconditional mean endowment growth. With IID fundamentals, constant risk aversion, and memory decay calibrated to microdata, the model generates a high and strongly countercyclical objective equity premium, while the subjective equity premium is virtually constant. Consistent with this theory, experienced payout growth (a weighted average of past growth rates) is negatively related to future stock market excess returns and subjective expectations errors in surveys, and positively to analysts’ forecasts of long-run earnings growth.

This paper documents evidence that financial constraints increase firms’ toxic emissions given that firms actively trade off abatement costs against potential legal liabilities. Exploring three quasi-natural experiments in which firms’ financial resources are likely exogenously affected, we find that relaxing financial constraints reduces U.S. public firms’ toxic releases. The effects of financial constraints on toxic releases are amplified when regulatory enforcement and external monitoring weaken. Overall, our evidence highlights the real effects of financial constraints in the form of environmental pollution, which is a costly negative externality imposed on society and public health.

We derive the default cascade model and the fire-sale spillover model in a unified interdependent framework. The interactions among banks include not only direct cross-holding, but also indirect dependency by holding mutual assets outside the banking system. Using data extracted from the European Banking Authority, we present the interdependency network composed of 48 banks and 21 asset classes. For the robustness, we employ three methods, called Anan, Hała and Maxe, to reconstruct the asset/liability cross-holding network. Then we combine the external portfolio holdings of each bank to compute the interdependency matrix. The interdependency network is much denser than the direct cross-holding network, showing the complex latent interaction among banks. Finally, we perform macroprudential stress tests for the European banking system, using the adverse scenario in EBA stress test as the initial shock. For different reconstructed networks, we illustrate the hierarchical cascades and show that the failure hierarchies are roughly the same except for a few banks, reflecting the overlapping portfolio holding accounts for the majority of defaults. We also calculate systemic vulnerability and individual vulnerability, which provide important information for supervision and relevant management actions.

We test whether limited cost pass-through encourages durable goods producers to build financial flexibility. We find that firms with more durable output have larger cash balances and marginal value of cash, lower propensity to pay dividends, and less financial leverage. The link between durable goods and financial flexibility is equally strong in low and zero leverage firms and is reduced in more concentrated industries and when the firm has captive financing activity. Consistent with high demand elasticity driving limited cost pass-through, we find that a large increase in input costs decreases markups and financial slack of durable goods firms in comparison to nondurable goods and services firms.