Based on individual CDS transactions cleared by the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation, we show that illiquidity strongly affects credit default swap premiums. We identify the following effects: first, transaction direction affects prices, as buy (sell) orders lead to premium increases (decreases). Second, larger transactions have a higher price impact. This finding stands in stark contrast to corporate bond markets. Third, traders charge higher premiums as a price for liquidity provision, not as compensation for asymmetric information. Fourth, buy-side investors pay significantly higher prices than dealers for demanding liquidity. Finally, inventory risk seems to matter little in explaining liquidity premiums.

Using a unique data set on German banks’ loans to the German real economy, we investigate banks’ credit risk. This data set contains the volume of loans, and write-downs on loans, per bank and industry. Our empirical study for the period 2003–2011 yields the following results: (i) alongside the average nationwide credit loss rate, industry composition, regional factors, and the state of the global economy, the loans’ maturity structure is identified as an additional driver of the bank-wide loss rates in the credit portfolio. (ii) The nationwide loss rate has the largest impact, followed by the maturity structure and the industry composition. (iii) For nationwide banks, these common factors explain about 26% of the time variation in the loss rate of credit portfolios; for regional banks, this figure is less than 8%.

Using a comprehensive dataset from German banks, we document the usage of sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) during the European sovereign debt crisis of 2008–2013. Banks used the sovereign CDS market to extend, rather than hedge, their long exposures to sovereign risk during this period. Lower loan exposure to sovereign risk is associated with greater protection selling in CDS, the effect being weaker when sovereign risk is high. Bank and country risk variables are mostly not associated with protection selling. The findings are driven by the actions of a few non-dealer banks which sold CDS protection aggressively at the onset of the crisis, but started covering their positions at its height while simultaneously shifting their assets towards sovereign bonds and loans. Our findings underscore the importance of accounting for derivatives exposure in building a complete picture and understanding fully the economic drivers of the bank-sovereign nexus of risk.