[We test several hypotheses on how takeover premium is related to investors' divergence of opinion on a target's equity value. We show that the total takeover premium, the preannouncement target stock price run-up, and the post-announcement stock price markup are all higher when investors have higher divergence of opinion. We obtain identical results with higher market-level investor sentiment. When divergence of opinion is higher, a firm is less likely to be a takeover target, although takeover synergy in successful takeovers is higher. Our results suggest that takeovers may play a role in explaining high contemporaneous stock prices in the presence of high divergence of investor opinion.]

This paper studies the factors that were associated with a bank's early exit from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in 2009. Executive pay restrictions were often a rationale cited for early TARP exit, and high levels of CEO pay in 2008 were associated with banks being significantly more likely to escape TARP. In addition, we find that larger publicly traded banks with better accounting performance, the stronger capital ratios, and fewer troubled loans and other assets exited early. Banks that raised private capital in 2009 were significantly more likely to return the taxpayers’ money early. The original eight TARP recipients, which received 165 billion of the 245 billion passed out, had weak tangible common equity ratios at the end of 2008, relative to other TARP recipients. Those eight banks raised common equity capital in 2009, and all at least partially exited the government's embrace.

This study investigates whether extensive disclosure reduces managerial expropriation of corporate resources by examining the potential effects of enhanced reporting on the values of cash assets and investment ventures, respectively. We uncover evidence that liquid asset holdings are valued at a discount by firms with fewer disclosure practices than their more transparent counterparts. Moreover, disclosure activity substantially improves the value of cash assets in excess of requirements for operations and investment. These findings suggest that detailed reporting facilitates the scrutiny and discipline of capital markets, thus preventing the diversion of cash reserves. In further support of the disciplinary power of greater disclosure, we find that value-destroying projects, through internal capital investment and external acquisitions, are concentrated in firms adopting opaque disclosure policies. Collectively, our results support the premise that extensive disclosure impairs insiders' abilities to utilize corporate resources in a self-serving manner. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources indicated in the text..

Using a comprehensive sample of U.S. mutual funds from 1992 to 2004, we find strong evidence that investment bank-affiliated funds underperform unaffiliated funds. Consistent with the conflict of interest hypothesis, we find that affiliated funds hold disproportionately large amounts of stocks of their initial public offering and seasoned equity offering clients. Moreover, worse-performing clients are more likely to be held by affiliated funds. Our results are robust to alternative risk adjustments, portfolio weighting schemes, and regression methodologies. Overall, our findings are consistent with the idea that investment banks use affiliated funds to support underwriting business at the expense of fund shareholders.

Using several large data sets of mortgage loans originated between 2004 and 2007, we find that in the prime mortgage market, banks generally sold low-default-risk loans into the secondary market while retaining higher-default-risk loans in their portfolios. In contrast, these lenders retained loans with lower prepayment risk relative to loans they sold. Securitization strategy of lenders changed dramatically in 2007 as the crisis set in with most unwilling to retain higher-default-risk loans in return for lower prepayment risk. Contrary to the prime market, the subprime market does not exhibit any clear pattern of adverse selection.

We test several hypotheses on how takeover premium is related to investors' divergence of opinion on a target's equity value. We show that the total takeover premium, the pre-announcement target stock price run-up, and the post-announcement stock price markup are all higher when investors have higher divergence of opinion. We obtain identical results with higher market-level investor sentiment. When divergence of opinion is higher, a firm is less likely to be a takeover target, although takeover synergy in successful takeovers is higher. Our results suggest that takeovers may play a role in explaining high contemporaneous stock prices in the presence of high divergence of investor opinion.

We report evidence that boundary solutions can cause a bias in the estimate of the probability of informed trading (PIN). We develop an algorithm to overcome this bias and use it to estimate PIN for nearly 80,000 stock-quarters between 1993 and 2004. We obtain two sets of PIN estimates by using the factorized likelihood functions in both Easley et al., 2010, Lin and Ke, 2011, respectively. We find that the estimate based on the EHO factorization is systematically smaller than the estimate based on the LK factorization, meaning that there is a downward bias associated with the EHO factorization. In addition, we find that boundary solutions appear with a very high frequency when the LK factorization is used. Thus it is necessary to use the LK factorization together with the algorithm in this paper. At last, we document several interesting empirical properties of PIN.

This paper provides a rationale for the use of convertible securities as the medium of exchange in corporate change-of-control transactions. We argue that convertible securities can resolve the information asymmetry about the bidder’s value while at the same time mitigating the information asymmetry about the target’s value. In contrast, deals with cash or stock can only address one information asymmetry or the other but not both. Empirically, we find that a bidder is more likely to offer convertible securities, rather than all cash or all stock, when both the bidder and its target face large asymmetric information problems. We also find that both bidders and targets in convertible deals enjoy positive abnormal stock returns around takeover announcements. These findings provide empirical support for the use of convertible securities to resolve the double-sided asymmetric information problem. Finally, we find that bidder returns in convertible deals are larger than in all-cash and all-stock deals, but that target returns in convertible deals are smaller than in all-cash and all-stock deals.

Financial institutions suffered large trading losses during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis. These losses cast doubt on the effectiveness of regulations and risk management systems based on a single Value-at-Risk (VaR) constraint. While some researchers have recommended using Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) to control tail risk, VaR remains popular among practitioners and regulators. Accordingly, our paper examines the effectiveness of multiple VaR constraints in controlling CVaR. Under certain conditions, we theoretically show that they are more effective than a single VaR constraint. Furthermore, we numerically find that the maximum CVaR permitted by the constraints is notably smaller than with a single constraint. These results suggest that regulations and risk management systems based on multiple VaR constraints are more effective in reducing tail risk than those based on a single VaR constraint.