This paper examines whether securitization has an ex-post effect on residential loan renegotiation. It makes two main contributions to the existing literature. First, this paper evaluates the re-default and self-cure rates of loans using bank-reported loan renegotiation data. Second, it conducts a transition probability study to better understand the re-default and self-cure dynamics by time and previous loan state. I find that previously delinquent portfolio loans are less likely to re-default and more likely to self-cure than comparable securitized loans during the intermediate time frame, but the difference diminishes afterwards. For previously cured loans, portfolio loans and securitized loans have generally similar re-default and self-cure rates over time. This paper emphasizes that it is important to understand the dynamic transition behavior of mortgage loans.

[We show that Treasury security prices in the secondary market decrease significantly in the few days before Treasury auctions and recover shortly thereafter, even though the time and amount of each auction are announced in advance. These results are linked to dealers' limited risk-bearing capacity and end-investors' imperfect capital mobility, highlighting the important role of frictions even in very liquid financial markets. Our results imply a hidden issuance cost to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, estimated to be 9 to 18 bps of the auction size, or over half a billion dollars for the issuance size in 2007.]

We show that contractual risk-taking incentives for chief executive officers (CEOs) increased at large U.S. commercial banks around 2000, when industry deregulation expanded these banks’ growth opportunities. Our econometric models indicate that CEOs responded positively to these incentives, especially at the larger banks best able to take advantage of these opportunities. Our results also suggest that bank boards responded to higher-than-average levels of risk by moderating CEO risk-taking incentives; however, this feedback effect is absent at the very largest banks with strong growth opportunities and a history of highly aggressive risk-taking incentives.

Using holdings data on a representative sample of all Shanghai Stock Exchange investors, we show that increases in ownership breadth (the fraction of market participants who own a stock) predict low returns: highest change quintile stocks underperform lowest quintile stocks by 23% per year. Small retail investors drive this result. Retail ownership breadth increases appear to be correlated with overpricing. Among institutional investors, however, the opposite holds: stocks in the top decile of wealth-weighted institutional breadth change outperform the bottom decile by 8% per year, consistent with prior work that interprets breadth as a measure of short-sales constraints.

We build a general equilibrium model to examine the implications of prospect theory for the disposition effect, asset prices, and trading volume. Diminishing sensitivity predicts a disposition effect, price momentum, a reduced return volatility, and a positive return-volume correlation. Loss aversion generally predicts the opposite. In calibrated economies, there is a nontrivial range of preference parameters for prospect theory to simultaneously explain the disposition effect, the momentum effect, and the equity premium puzzle. Our model is helpful for understanding a wide range of financial phenomena and it also suggests new testable predictions.

Theoretically, the implied cost of capital (ICC) is a good proxy for time-varying expected returns. We find that aggregate ICC strongly predicts future excess market returns at horizons ranging from one month to four years. This predictive power persists even in the presence of popular valuation ratios and business cycle variables, both in-sample and out-of-sample, and is robust to alternative implementations. We also find that ICCs of size and book-to-market portfolios predict corresponding portfolio returns.

Firms with higher asset growth rates subsequently experience lower stock returns in international equity markets, consistent with the U.S. evidence. This negative effect of asset growth on returns is stronger in more developed capital markets and markets where stocks are more efficiently priced, but is unrelated to country characteristics representing limits to arbitrage, investor protection, and accounting quality. The evidence suggests that the cross-sectional relation between asset growth and stock return is more likely due to an optimal investment effect than due to overinvestment, market timing, or other forms of mispricing.

When a firm cross-lists its shares in segmented markets, the price of the first issued share, as a reference, plays both an informational and anchoring role in pricing the second issued share. We develop a model illustrating the dual-role. Empirically, we examine a group of Chinese firms that first issue foreign shares and then domestic A-shares, for which the anchoring effect adds to the A-share underpricing. Consistent with the model predictions, we find that the A-share underpricing is positively related to the difference in costs of capital in the two segmented markets, and that this positive association is weaker when participants are less likely to resort to the anchoring heuristic and when the A-share valuation involves less uncertainty.

We measure an individual stock’s misvaluation based on the deviation of its price from predicted intrinsic value. Both under- and overvalued stocks identified by this misvaluation measure exhibit greater valuation uncertainty and arbitrage difficulty, and the misvaluation measure strongly predicts stock returns incremental to size, book-to-market ratio, past returns, and various return anomalies. Based on the misvaluation measure, we form a misvaluation factor and find that stock return covariances with this factor possess significant and robust return predictive power. We further show that the misvaluation factor predicts future economic conditions, providing additional insight into the real effect of systematic misvaluation in the stock market.