ABSTRACT This study investigates whether extensive disclosure reduces managerial expropriation of corporate resources by examining the potential effects of enhanced reporting on the values of cash assets and investment ventures, respectively. We uncover evidence that liquid asset holdings are valued at a discount by firms with fewer disclosure practices than their more transparent counterparts. Moreover, disclosure activity substantially improves the value of cash assets in excess of requirements for operations and investment. These findings suggest that detailed reporting facilitates the scrutiny and discipline of capital markets, thus preventing the diversion of cash reserves. In further support of the disciplinary power of greater disclosure, we find that value-destroying projects, through internal capital investment and external acquisitions, are concentrated in firms adopting opaque disclosure policies. Collectively, our results support the premise that extensive disclosure impairs insiders' abilities to utilize corporate resources in a self-serving manner. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources indicated in the text..

We report evidence that boundary solutions can cause a bias in the estimate of the probability of informed trading (PIN). We develop an algorithm to overcome this bias and use it to estimate PIN for nearly 80,000 stock-quarters between 1993 and 2004. We obtain two sets of PIN estimates by using the factorized likelihood functions in both Easley et al., 2010, Lin and Ke, 2011, respectively. We find that the estimate based on the EHO factorization is systematically smaller than the estimate based on the LK factorization, meaning that there is a downward bias associated with the EHO factorization. In addition, we find that boundary solutions appear with a very high frequency when the LK factorization is used. Thus it is necessary to use the LK factorization together with the algorithm in this paper. At last, we document several interesting empirical properties of PIN.